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Abstract 
With the increasing popularity of the online channel, both consumers and firms are 
engaging in more and more multi-channel activities. On the one hand, consumers can integrate 
information from searches on both online and offline channels, and then decide on the best 
channel to buy from. On the other hand, firms need to consider consumer behavior in different 
channels in their strategy design. As a result, cross-channel interactions between consumer 
behavior and firm strategy can be within the same channel or across different channels. While 
the within-channel interaction has been studied extensively in the previous literature, there is 
much less research on the cross-channel interaction. In my dissertation, I add to the 
understanding of consumer behavior and firm strategy in the multi-channel environment by 
empirically analyzing their cross-channel interactions. 
This dissertation consists of three separate but related essays. The first answers the 
question: How does consumer behavior affect optimal product portfolio strategies in online 
versus offline channels? I develop an empirical model to simultaneously identify the 
cannibalization effect (within a brand) and the competition effect (between different brands) in 
different retail channels. I further examine how these effects are affected by consumer 
preferences.  The second essay answers the question: How does a  
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firm’s offline strategy affect consumer online behavior? I use a natural experiment to examine 
how the awareness and convenience effects from opening new retail stores affect the online 
search. The final essay answers the question: How does online banking affect entry/exit of 
offline bank branches?  I develop and estimate a dynamic entry/exit model examining the 
relationship between technological advances and market structure evolution. My counterfactual 
analysis shows that the asymmetric reduction in operating costs is the most significant factor 
driving recent changes in the U.S. banking industry, followed by increased entry costs and 
increased deposits for large banks due to greater online presence. My findings provide important 
implications for firms engaging in multi-channel activities.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The emergence and popularity of the online channel change the way consumers search 
for information and make decisions in online and offline environments. This has important 
implications for firms’ multi-channel strategies and well as the evolution of markets. On the one 
hand, consumers can integrate information from searches on both online and offline channels, 
and then decide on the best channel to buy from. On the other hand, firms need to consider 
consumer behavior in different channels in their strategy design. As a result, the cross-channel 
interactions between consumer behavior and firm strategy can be within the same channel or 
across different channels as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Interactions between consumers and firms in the multi-channel environment 
While the within-channel interaction has been studied extensively in the previous 
literature, there is much less research on the cross-channel interaction. In my dissertation, I add 
to the understanding of consumer behavior and firm strategy in the multi-channel environment 
by empirically analyzing their cross-channel interactions from three perspectives.  
In the first essay, I develop an empirical model to simultaneously identify the 
cannibalization effect (within a brand) and the competition effect (between different brands) in 
different retail channels. I further examine how these effects are affected by consumer 
preferences. Our results show that the online market exhibits stronger cannibalization and 
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competition than the offline channel. Moreover, heterogeneity in consumer search behavior and 
brand loyalty explain a significant fraction of the variation in both cannibalization and 
competition between the two channels. My findings suggest that firms should offer fewer models 
in the online channel and when consumers are highly loyal. 
In the second essay, I examine how opening a new retail store affects the cognitive costs 
of online search and the physical cost of offline search. I find that, for consumers with prior 
experience on the retailer’s website, opening a new store leads to a 68% increase in the number 
of visits to the retailer’s website by consumers who live in the broader marketing area of the new 
store, while it leads to a 49% decrease in the number of visits to the retailer’s website by 
consumers who live in the nearby shopping region. More interestingly, the effect of store entry in 
the shopping region on decreasing website search is weaker when consumers are more efficient 
in using the online channel. My results are robust to corrections for endogeneity in the choice of 
new store locations using different matching methods.  
In the third essay, I develop and estimate a dynamic entry/exit model examining the 
relationship between technological advances and market structure evolution to understand the 
relationships between these intriguing phenomena. Despite the rise of consumer online banking, 
there has been little reduction in the number of brick and mortar bank branches in the U.S. At the 
same time, large national banks have expanded their branch networks at the cost of small local 
banks. My findings suggest that the advent of online banking provides significant competitive 
advantages to large national banks over small local banks that lower large banks’ offline 
operating costs and increase consumer deposits; yet increase entry costs. A counterfactual 
analysis shows that the asymmetric reduction in operating costs is the most significant factor 
3 
 
3 
 
driving recent changes in the U.S. banking industry, followed by increased entry costs and 
increased deposits for large banks due to greater online presence. 
In sum, the results presented in this dissertation provide insight into the multi-channel 
business models. These studies also contribute to the literature on product portfolio management 
and local competition.  
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Chapter 2 Consumer Preferences, Cannibalization and 
Competition: Evidence from the Personal Computer Industry 
Understanding the degree of cannibalization and competition in online and offline 
markets is important to firms’ product line designs. However, few empirical studies have 
measured both effects simultaneously or have examined the factors that determine the extent of 
cannibalization and competition. In this study, we develop an empirical model to identify 
cannibalization and competition effects simultaneously in different markets, and further examine 
the impacts of consumer preferences on these two effects in a single integrated framework. Using 
data from the U.S. personal computer (PC) industry, we find that the online market exhibits 
stronger cannibalization and competition than the offline market. Both effects are significantly 
influenced by consumers’ search behavior and brand loyalty. Specifically, more active consumer 
search not only intensifies inter-brand competition but also amplifies intra-brand 
cannibalization. In addition, search has a higher impact on cannibalization than competition. 
Stronger consumer brand loyalty mitigates inter-brand competition, but its effect on intra-brand 
cannibalization varies for different consumer segments. In markets consisting of more high-end 
consumers, the intra-brand cannibalization increases with consumer brand loyalty, while, in 
contrast, in markets consisting of more low-end consumers, the intra-brand cannibalization 
decreases with consumer brand loyalty. The differences in consumer search and brand loyalty 
explain a significant fraction of the variations in both cannibalization and competition between 
different PC markets. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Product proliferation is an important component of a firm’s competitive strategy and is 
commonly observed in practice. For example, in the personal computer (PC) industry, we often 
observe multiple models of desktops or laptops offered by the same firm or brand. In 2001, HP 
offered 19 desktop models with varying configurations, and this number increased to 35 in 2008. 
Similar phenomena were observed for other PC manufacturers as well. Product proliferation is 
not specific to the PC industry. According to Bernard et al. (2006), multiproduct firms account 
for more than 90% of the output in the U.S. manufacturing sectors. 
Product proliferation has at least two competing effects on firm profitability.1 First, it has 
an inter-brand competition effect: when introducing a greater variety of product offerings, a firm 
can attract new consumers with heterogeneous tastes and induce consumers to switch from 
competitors (Bayus and Putsis 1999). Second, it has an intra-brand cannibalization effect: 
products offered by the same firm are often considered by consumers as close substitutes so that 
“one product’s customers are at the expense of other products offered by the same firm” (Mason 
and Milne 1994, p.163).2 
Firms need to consider both intra-brand cannibalization and inter-brand competition 
effects when designing their product lines (Kadiyali et al. 1998; Ruebeck 2005; Wilson 2011). A 
stronger cannibalization effect gives incentives for firms to shorten their product lines, whereas a 
fiercer competition between firms may induce them to expand their product lines. Due to the 
rapid growth of the online market, the product line design in online and offline markets becomes 
                                                 
1 Other effects such as market expansion are not the focus of this study, but will be controlled in our 
analysis. 
2 In this study, we assume each firm has a single brand, so we use brand and firm interchangeably. Within 
each brand (e.g. Dell) there can be many products (e.g. Latitude E6400, XPS 8500, etc.). 
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an increasingly more important issue for multiproduct firms to consider. Earlier work in 
information systems suggests some important differences between the online and offline 
markets. For example, the online channel has lower search cost (Bakos 1997; Clemons et al. 
2002; Ghose and Yao 2011) and menu cost (Bailey 1998; Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000) 
compared to brick-and-mortar stores. These differences have important implications to firms’ 
online pricing (Clemons et al. 2002; Ghose and Yao 2011). Recent studies have also started to 
examine the implications of this new channel to firms’ product strategy. For example, 
Brynjolffson et al. (2011) suggest that the online market creates a long tail in the distribution of 
sales by substantially increasing the market shares of niche products. A natural question to ask 
following these findings is: how should firms optimize their product offerings online? Should 
firms offer more products online than offline given its ability to attract consumers into buying 
more niche products? Given that the online and offline markets differ in many key characteristics 
that can potentially affect the degree of intra-brand cannibalization and inter-brand competition, 
it is important for firms to gauge both cannibalization and competition effects in online and 
offline markets and to understand their influencing factors to make optimal product line 
decisions. 
Our first objective in this study is to empirically measure intra-brand cannibalization and 
inter-brand competition and examine whether they vary across online and offline markets. We 
develop a unified framework to jointly estimate both cannibalization and competition in different 
markets in the U.S. PC industry. We find significant differences in both effects between online 
and offline markets. Specifically, the online market exhibits both stronger intra-brand 
cannibalization and stronger inter-brand competition than the offline market for the PC industry.  
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This leads to our second research question: what factors drive intra-brand 
cannibalization and inter-brand competition in different markets? In particular, we focus on how 
consumer brand loyalty and search behavior influence cannibalization and competition, 
respectively. To answer this question, we model both intra-brand cannibalization and inter-brand 
competition as functions of consumer preferences. We find that, consistent with intuition, 
stronger consumer brand loyalty reduces inter-brand competition. The impact of brand loyalty on 
intra-brand cannibalization, however, varies for different segments of consumers. Specifically, 
stronger brand loyalty increases intra-brand cannibalization in markets consisting of more high-
end consumers (high income, low price sensitivity), but decreases intra-brand cannibalization in 
markets consisting of more low-end consumers (low income, high price sensitivity). In addition, 
we find that more active consumer search not only intensifies inter-brand competition but also 
amplifies intra-brand cannibalization to a larger extent, suggesting that more consumer search 
before purchase encourages more comparisons within the same brand than between different 
brands. The differences in consumer search and brand loyalty explain a significant fraction of the 
variations in both cannibalization and competition between different PC markets. 
This study makes the following important contributions. First, our study offers a 
framework to jointly identify intra-brand cannibalization and inter-brand competition in different 
markets as well as the impacts of demand side factors on competition and cannibalization in a 
single integrated model, while at the same time controlling for potential endogeneity issue. Prior 
studies (e.g., Brynjolfsson et al. 2009; Hui 2004; Watson 2009) have focused on either 
cannibalization or competition, but have not measured them simultaneously for different 
markets. Our results suggest that both cannibalization and competition vary across online and 
offline markets and need to be considered jointly for optimal product line design. Specifically, 
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while the higher online competition between firms has been recognized in academic research and 
practice, the higher online cannibalization between products within a firm has been largely 
overlooked. This could lead to sub-optimal product line design in the online market.  
Second, our study highlights important demand side factors (i.e., consumer preferences) 
that influence both cannibalization and competition, whereas prior studies (e.g., Thomadsen 
2007) have mainly focused on the supply side factors (e.g., product characteristics and pricing). 
Our results suggest that consumer brand loyalty and search behavior have significant impacts on 
cannibalization and competition, and in addition, that the differences in these consumer 
preferences play an important role in explaining the variations in cannibalization and competition 
between different markets. 
In particular, when drawing implications about the impact of brand loyalty on product 
cannibalization, it is important for firms to consider consumers’ brand loyalties in different 
segments because their impacts are different. For example, if a market is mainly composed of 
loyal consumers from the high-end segment, intra-brand cannibalization can be high and it may 
be optimal for manufacturers to offer fewer products to the market. In fact, in our data, we 
observe a higher interaction between loyalty and income in the online channel. Because brand 
loyalty of high end consumers has a positive impact on cannibalization, the characteristics of the 
online population in the PC market can make it more likely for us to observe a higher 
cannibalization online. 
 While prior IS studies have primarily focused on the impact of lowered search cost on 
inter-firm competition, we find that the lowered search cost not only affects competition, but also 
affects cannibalization. More importantly, our result suggests that search in fact can have a 
higher impact on cannibalization than competition. This result has important implications: while 
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the increased competition due to lower search cost online may encourage firms to offer more 
products to attract consumers, it can increase intra-brand cannibalization to a larger extent, 
limiting the optimal number of products to offer. Therefore, the lowered search cost online does 
not necessarily favor a longer product line. This can be counter-intuitive since online stores are 
often not limited by shelf space or capacity constraints, and it is generally cheaper to host a 
greater product variety online. However, a shorter product line online may be optimal if the 
higher intra-brand cannibalization online is a major concern.  
2.2 Literature Review 
Our study is closely related to the literature on product proliferation. Most studies in this 
research stream develop theoretical models to analyze firms’ decisions on product quality (Desai 
2001; Katz 1984; Moorthy 1984) or on the length of product line (Bayus and Putsis 1999; 
Bordley 2003; Liu and Cui 2010; Shugan 1989). When consumers have heterogeneous 
preferences over quality, firms have incentives to vertically differentiate their products to meet 
the needs of different consumers. Desai (2001) develops a model for duopolistic competition 
where consumers have heterogeneous preferences over brand in addition to quality. His results 
suggest that the brand preferences of consumers with different quality sensitivities affect intra-
brand cannibalization differently. Studies on the length of product line suggest that a longer 
product line can lead to more severe product cannibalization and diminishing marginal 
contribution to firm performance (Draganska and Jain 2005) or even negative impact on firm 
profit (Bayus and Putsis 1999). The effectiveness of product proliferation as a marketing strategy 
thus is clearly limited by the extent of product cannibalization. However, there have been few 
attempts to study cannibalization, competition and their influencing factors simultaneously, 
which is a gap in the literature that this study aims to fill. 
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Prior studies have, however, studied each of the two effects (cannibalization and 
competition) separately. The research stream on product cannibalization has used different 
methods to quantify the extent of intra-brand cannibalization. Most papers infer about 
cannibalization indirectly from cross-product price elasticity (Berry et al. 1995), or from the 
change of firm performance in response to the change in the length of product line (Bayus and 
Putsis 1999; Draganska and Jain 2005). Notably Hui (2004) examines a direct measure of intra-
brand cannibalization and then links cannibalization to firm brand value. Compared with the 
cross elasticity between individual products, this measure indicates the degree of cannibalization 
at an aggregate level. Such a single measure is especially suitable to study our research question, 
which examines the link between cannibalization and consumer characteristics at the market 
level. We thus use similar aggregate-level measures in this study. Our study is different from Hui 
(2004) in two aspects: first, we measure not only intra-brand cannibalization but also inter-brand 
competition, and second, more importantly, we further investigate the impact of consumer 
preferences on both cannibalization and competition in a single integrated model.  
The recent research stream on inter-brand competition effect focuses on comparing this 
effect between online and offline markets. Most research in this area focuses on the 
consequences of lower search costs online and often uses price dispersion as an index of 
competition (e.g., Baye et al. 2006; Brynjolfsson et al. 2010; Clemons et al. 2002). Some 
researchers suggest that firms should optimize their product line design by offering more 
differentiated products in the online market to mitigate online competition (Bar-Isaac et al. 2009; 
Kuksov 2004). We capture the effect of consumer search on product competition in our model, 
and different from previous studies, we further compare this effect with the impact of consumer 
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search on cannibalization and include consumer preference variables to help explain the 
differences in both cannibalization and competition between different markets.  
2.3 Data Description 
Our empirical analyses focus on the U.S. PC industry. We choose the PC industry as the 
empirical context for the following three reasons. First, it is a highly competitive market with a 
number of major PC makers, each offering a variety of computer models. This combination 
allows us to study both inter-brand competition and intra-brand cannibalization. Second, 
products in the PC industry are vertically differentiated with similar functions, so PC vendors 
compete fiercely on product quality, such as CPU speed. This enables us to apply Lancaster’s 
characteristics theory of value (Lancaster 1966) in our empirical model. Third, this is a dynamic 
industry characterized by frequent new product introductions and quality improvements, which 
provide us with more variations in the data that are helpful for parameter identification. 
Our data come from two datasets. The first dataset is PC sales data between 2004 and 
2008 collected by the International Data Corporation (IDC). For each PC model, IDC records its 
manufacturer, form factor (desktop or laptop), CPU, average retail price, and unit sales in each 
quarter. The sales data are available for six distribution channels: Internet, retail, direct inbound, 
direct outbound, dealer/value-added reseller/systems integrator, and others. In this study, we use 
data for the Internet and retail channels only,3 because of two reasons: first, our focus is on 
comparing the two channels, and second, these two channels mostly reflect consumer purchases 
and therefore can be matched with the information from our second dataset—the Consumer 
Technographics Benchmark survey data for the same period from Forrester Research. The 
                                                 
3 Consumer purchases in other channels will fall under an outside option in our demand model presented 
later. 
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benchmark survey is an annual survey of over 50,000 households in North America, from which 
the households from Canada are excluded from our analysis. The survey includes questions 
about consumer preferences, general shopping behaviors and purchase decisions for computers, 
among other products. Detailed information about consumers’ PC purchases in the survey is used 
to match their shopping behaviors to IDC sales data. Specifically, our matching is based on three 
factors: year of purchase, form factor (desktop or laptop) and channel of purchase (online or 
offline), given that our consumer preference variables will be measured at the market level. 
While the IDC sales data allow us to estimate a demand model that quantifies cannibalization 
and competition in the PC market, the Forrester survey data help explain how consumer 
preferences affect the extent of cannibalization and competition in the same market. 
In our study, we restrict our analyses to firms identified in both the IDC sales data and the 
Forrester surveys. Our final dataset includes the eight largest PC firms between 2004 and 2008: 
Acer, Apple, Dell, Gateway, HP, Lenovo, Sony, and Toshiba. These firms accounted for 77% of 
total sales in the PC industry during the period. In addition, we aggregate the quarterly IDC sales 
data to a yearly level to match the annual Forrester surveys. 
2.4 Empirical Model 
2.4.1 Cannibalization and Competition Effects 
To address our first research objective that aims to identify both intra-brand 
cannibalization and inter-brand competition and compare them across online and offline markets, 
we develop an empirical model under the generalized extreme-value (GEV) discrete choice 
framework (McFadden 1978). In particular, we consider consumers’ PC purchases for different 
form factors (desktop or laptop) and in different channels (online or offline). We thus set up a 
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two-level nested logit model as illustrated in Figure 24. In the first level, the four nests 
correspond to the four markets identified by form factor and channel combinations: laptop-
online, desktop-online, laptop-offline, and desktop-offline. The second level sub-nests include all 
the firms competing in the same market, and each sub-nest has all the computer models from the 
same firm. With eight firms in our analysis, in total we have 30 sub-nests in the second level 
because Toshiba desktops are excluded due to very limited sales. 
 
Figure 2：Nest Structure of Our Two-level Nested Logit Model 
Let l index form factor and m index channel. The utility to consumer h from purchasing 
PC model i from firm j in nest lm is specified as:5 
𝑈ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 = 𝛼𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 + 𝜑1𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙 + 𝜑2𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙
2 + 𝑏𝑗 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑑𝑙𝑚 + 𝜉𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 + 𝜀ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 (1) 
Here, 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 is the price of the PC model. 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙 represents the age of the PC model, 
measured as the time elapsed since it was first available in either channel. We include the 
quadratic term of 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙 to capture any nonlinearity in consumer preferences for product vintage. 𝑏𝑗 
is the brand value of firm j. 𝑐𝑖 captures consumer preferences for the CPU used in model i, which 
                                                 
4 The rationale behind the choice of our nest structure is explained in detail in Appendix A. 
5 For readability purpose, we suppress all time subscripts. 
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is a key indicator for PC quality because it is the most important component in determining the 
performance of a PC (Bresnahan et al. 1997; Hui 2004; Venkatesh and Mahajan 1997).6 𝑑𝑙𝑚 
stands for the interactions of the form factor dummies with the channel dummies to capture form 
factor and channel fixed effects. 𝜉𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 captures the unobserved product attributes, while 𝜀ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 
captures the idiosyncratic taste of consumer h. 
The unconditional market share of PC model i from firm j in nest lm is the product of 
three terms: 
𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 = 𝑠𝑖|𝑗|𝑙𝑚 ∙ 𝑠𝑗|𝑙𝑚 ∙ 𝑠𝑙𝑚.       (2) 
Here 𝑠𝑙𝑚 is the (unconditional) market share of nest lm, 𝑠𝑗|𝑙𝑚 is the market share of firm j 
in nest lm, and 𝑠𝑖|𝑗|𝑙𝑚 is the market share of model i within firm j in nest lm. Following the 
generalized extreme-value framework, we have: 
𝑠𝑖|𝑗|𝑙𝑚 =
𝑒
𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 1−𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚⁄
𝐺𝑗𝑙𝑚
;       (3) 
𝑠𝑗|𝑙𝑚 =
𝐺𝑗𝑙𝑚
1−𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 1−𝜌𝑙𝑚⁄
𝐹𝑙𝑚
;      (4) 
𝑠𝑙𝑚 =
𝐹𝑙𝑚
1−𝜌𝑙𝑚
∑ 𝐹𝑙𝑚
1−𝜌𝑙𝑚𝑙𝑚
;       (5) 
where 
𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑚 = 𝛼𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 + 𝜑1𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙 + 𝜑2𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙
2 + 𝑏𝑗 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑑𝑙𝑚 + 𝜉𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚; (6) 
𝐺𝑗𝑙𝑚 = ∑ 𝑒
𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 1−𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚⁄
𝑖∈𝑗𝑙𝑚 ;      (7) 
𝐹𝑙𝑚 = ∑ 𝐺𝑗𝑙𝑚
1−𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 1−𝜌𝑙𝑚⁄
𝑗∈𝑙𝑚 .     (8) 
As a result, the unconditional market share of model i from firm j in nest lm is given by: 
                                                 
6 Because there are over 100 different CPUs in our dataset, it is empirically challenging to estimate a 
separate dummy variable for each CPU. Following Gordon (2009) and Sriram et al. (2010), we classify all CPUs 
into five categories based on their benchmark scores. Our results are robust to the number of CPU categories. 
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𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 =
𝑒
𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 1−𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚⁄
𝐺𝑗𝑙𝑚
1−(1−𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚) (1−𝜌𝑙𝑚)⁄ ∙𝐹𝑙𝑚
𝜌𝑙𝑚 ∙∑ 𝐹𝑙𝑚
1−𝜌𝑙𝑚𝑙𝑚
.   (9) 
Note that 𝐺𝑗𝑙𝑚 and 𝐹𝑙𝑚 are the inclusive values that consumers expect to receive when 
choosing the best option in sub-nest jlm and in nest lm, respectively. They indicate the overall 
attractiveness of the corresponding sub-nest or nest.  
Following Berry (1994), we can transform Equation (9) into its equivalent linear form: 
log(𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚) − log(𝑦0) = 𝛼𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 + 𝜑1𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙 + 𝜑2𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙
2 + 𝑏𝑗 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑑𝑙𝑚 + 
𝜌𝑙𝑚 log(𝑆𝑗|𝑙𝑚) + 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 log(𝑆i|𝑗|𝑙𝑚) + 𝜉𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚.    (10) 
Here, 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 is the unit sales of model i, and 𝑦0 is the quantity corresponding to the outside 
option. To allow for the possibility that the market size may be changing over time, we use a set 
of yearly dummies to control for the size of outside option in our estimation process.7 
The parameter 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 measures the similarity between the alternatives within sub-nest jlm 
perceived by consumers, and thus captures the intra-brand cannibalization within firm j in market 
lm. The rationale is that when consumers choose products to maximize their utility, the extent of 
competition between products depends on how closely these products are perceived by 
consumers. The larger the similarity parameter 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚, the closer the products are perceived, and 
the stronger the cannibalization between firm j’s own PC models. This can be seen from 
Equation (10) above. Note that log(𝑆i|𝑗|𝑙𝑚) is always negative in the 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 log(𝑆i|𝑗|𝑙𝑚) term. 
When 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 becomes larger, the sales of each individual product (𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚) will become smaller 
given the same market shares within sub-nest jlm, indicating stronger intra-brand 
                                                 
7 Using our regression results, we also examine the evolution of the outside option in our model. We 
compare the estimated yearly dummies with the total number of PC models over the years. We find that as the 
number of models increased, the size of outside option decreased over the years. This pattern may provide a crude 
indication for the market expansion effect. However, given the focus of this study, we do not pursue to investigate 
this effect in detail. 
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cannibalization. Following the same logic, we consider the parameter 𝜌𝑙𝑚 to capture the inter-
brand competition between firms in market lm since it measures the perceived similarity between 
the alternatives within nest lm. The larger the parameter 𝜌𝑙𝑚, the more intense the competition 
between different firms within the market.8 
To compare cannibalization and competition across online and offline markets, we model 
both 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 and 𝜌𝑙𝑚 as functions of the interacted formfactor and channel dummies. We also 
include firm fixed effects in the function for 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚. To ensure that 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 and 𝜌𝑙𝑚 are between 0 and 
1, we apply a logistic transformation: 
𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 =
𝑒
𝜃𝑗+𝜃𝑙𝑚
1+𝑒
𝜃𝑗+𝜃𝑙𝑚
;      (11) 
𝜌𝑙𝑚 =
𝑒𝜇𝑙𝑚
1+𝑒𝜇𝑙𝑚
.       (12) 
After estimating 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 and 𝜌𝑙𝑚, we can then compare these two effects between online and 
offline markets to examine whether the cannibalization and competition effects vary in different 
markets. 
2.4.2 Consumer Preferences 
To answer our second research question that aims to examine the impacts of consumer 
preferences on cannibalization and competition, we further link 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 and 𝜌𝑙𝑚 to variables 
indicating consumer preferences. Literature suggests that there are at least two aspects of 
                                                 
8 To see the connection between our cannibalization parameter and change in sales, we run a simple 
simulation according to Equation (10) to see how product sales respond to changes in the number of products at 
different values of 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚. By fixing other parameters except the number of products offered by a firm, it shows that, 
increasing the number of products, e.g., from 5 to 10, doubles the total sales for the firm when 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 = 0, but leads to 
no gain in total sales for the firm when 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 = 1. Similar insight can be drawn for competition parameter 𝜌𝑙𝑚. The 
detail of the simulation is available upon request.  
17 
 
17 
 
consumer preferences related to intra-brand cannibalization and inter-brand competition: brand 
loyalty and search behavior. 
Multiproduct firms usually differentiate products on quality to serve consumer segments 
varying in preferences for quality (Moorthy 1984; Moorthy 1988; Mussa and Rosen 2012). Firms 
are concerned, however, about their low-quality product cannibalizing the demand meant for 
their high-quality product. The magnitude of this cannibalization is determined by the 
substitutability between high-quality and low-quality products. This substitutability is contingent 
on the price and quality of each product, while firms’ price and quality decisions are affected by 
consumers’ preferences for different brands. The brand loyalties of price-sensitive (low-end) and 
quality-conscious (high-end) consumers can have different effects on firms’ price and quality 
decisions, which, as a result, affect intra-brand cannibalization differently (Desai 2001). Based 
on the results from Desai’s analytical model, if the brand preference of price-sensitive consumers 
is higher, the lack of competition between low-quality products from different firms will likely 
make them less attractive for the high-end consumers (as a result of firms optimizing both 
quality and price), thus mitigating intra-brand cannibalization. Conversely, if the brand 
preference of quality-conscious consumers is higher, the lack of competition between high-
quality products will likely make them less attractive and thus increase the high-end consumers’ 
incentives to buy the low-quality product, intensifying the intra-brand cannibalization. 
Correspondingly, we expect the impact of brand loyalty on intra-brand cannibalization to be 
positive in markets that consist of more quality-conscious consumers and negative in markets 
that consist of more price-sensitive consumers.  
In addition to affecting intra-brand cannibalization, consumer brand loyalty also affects 
the competition between brands. Consumers loyal to a brand typically conduct fewer searches for 
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alternatives, effectively reducing their consideration set and leading to less brand switching 
(Sambandam and Lord 1995). Moreover, loyal customers become less price sensitive 
(Krishnamurth and Raj 1991) and less responsive to promotions (Empen et al. 2011; Raju et al. 
1990). As a result, stronger brand loyalty can reduce the intensity of inter-brand competition, 
which applies to both high-end and low-end consumer segments. Due to a lack of theoretical 
support and empirical evidence, we do not consider the difference between high-end and low-end 
consumers when modeling the effect of brand loyalty on inter-brand competition.  
Consumer search is another factor that may affect both cannibalization and competition. 
Consumers usually engage in active prior-purchase search when they are uncertain about the 
attributes or prices of alternative products and must gather further information in order to reach a 
utility-maximizing choice (Feinberg and Huber 1996; Ratchford 1982). The prior-purchase 
search is more important for complex decisions, such as purchases of computers (Bettman 1979). 
After filtering the available alternatives, consumers form their consideration sets that include 
products that they will consider (Wright and Barbour 1977). Because prior-purchase search may 
involve comparing products from different firms as well as comparing products from the same 
firm, it has the potential to affect inter-brand competition as well as intra-brand cannibalization.  
To capture the impacts of brand loyalty and search behavior on cannibalization and 
competition, we further incorporate these consumer preference variables into the functions for 
𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 and 𝜌𝑙𝑚: 
𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 =
𝑒
𝛽1𝐿𝑙𝑚+𝛽2𝐼𝑙𝑚+𝛽3𝐿𝑙𝑚∗𝐼𝑙𝑚+𝛽4𝐿𝑙𝑚∗𝐼𝑙𝑚
2 +𝛽5𝑆𝑙𝑚+𝛽6𝑀𝑗𝑙𝑚+𝜃𝑗+𝜃𝑙𝑚
1+𝑒
𝛽1𝐿𝑙𝑚+𝛽2𝐼𝑙𝑚+𝛽3𝐿𝑙𝑚∗𝐼𝑙𝑚+𝛽4𝐿𝑙𝑚∗𝐼𝑙𝑚
2 +𝛽5𝑆𝑙𝑚+𝛽6𝑀𝑗𝑙𝑚+𝜃𝑗+𝜃𝑙𝑚
;  (13) 
𝜌𝑙𝑚 =
𝑒𝛾1𝐿𝑙𝑚+𝛾2𝑆𝑙𝑚+𝜇𝑙𝑚
1+𝑒𝛾1𝐿𝑙𝑚+𝛾2𝑆𝑙𝑚+𝜇𝑙𝑚
.       (14) 
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Here, 𝐿𝑙𝑚 is the average brand loyalty of consumers who shop for form factor l in 
channel m. We use the item “When I find a brand I like, I stick to it” in the Forrester survey to 
measure brand loyalty.9 In the literature, brand loyalty has been operationalized from either 
behavioral or attitudinal perspectives. Specifically, behavioral loyalty is determined by the 
observed outcome, such as repeated purchase (Guadagni and Little 1983; Kahn et al. 1986), 
while attitudinal loyalty focuses on consumers’ stated preferences and purchase intentions 
(Chaudhuri and Holbrook 2001; Jacoby and Kyner 1973). Our measurement falls into the latter 
category. 
𝐼𝑙𝑚 represents the average income of consumers who shop for form factor l in channel m. 
Consumers’ income levels reflect their price sensitivities. High-income (low-income) consumers 
are expected to be low (high) in price sensitivities. Thus, if a market has a high (low) average 
income, we expect it to be mainly influenced by high-end (low-end) consumers. Given our 
earlier discussion that the impact of brand loyalty on intra-brand cannibalization differs across 
markets consisting of different consumers, we interact the brand loyalty 𝐿𝑙𝑚 with the average 
income 𝐼𝑙𝑚 in both linear and quadratic terms, so that the impact of brand loyalty on 
cannibalization may vary at different income levels. 
𝑆𝑙𝑚 captures the average consumer preference for prior-purchase search for the 
consumers who shop for form factor l in channel m. A consumer’s preference for search is 
measured by the survey item about consumer tendency to “research products for purchase” in 
the Forrester survey. To control for the impact that the number of models has on product 
                                                 
9 We also tried using a different survey item “I would pay more for products consistent with an image I 
like” to measure brand loyalty and obtained similar results. 
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cannibalization, we add 𝑀𝑗𝑙𝑚 into our model, which is the ratio of the number of models offered 
by firm j to the total number of models in nest lm. 
2.5 Estimation 
We first replace 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 and 𝜌l𝑚 in Equation (10) with Equations (11) and (12) to answer 
our first research question of whether cannibalization and competition vary across markets, and 
then replace 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 and 𝜌𝑙𝑚 in Equation (10) with Equations (13) and (14) to answer our second 
research question of how consumer preferences affect cannibalization and competition. This 
setup jointly estimates cannibalization and competition as well as the impacts of two demand 
side factors (search and loyalty) on both cannibalization and competition in a single integrated 
framework. This approach is more efficient than a two-step procedure like the one used by Hui 
(2004). This setup also allows us to observe the extent of variations in cannibalization and 
competition that can be explained by the consumer preference variables included in this study. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the key variables and Table 2 presents their 
correlations. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Description Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 Unit sales 2,851 65,691 154,819 2 2,160,372 
𝑠𝑗|𝑙𝑚 Market share of firm j in nest 𝑙𝑚 2,851 0.20 0.24 0.00* 0.89 
𝑠𝑖|𝑗|𝑙𝑚 Market share of model i in sub-nest 𝑗𝑙𝑚 2,851 0.05 0.08 0.00* 0.98 
𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 Price (in $1,000) 2,851 0.92 0.48 0.21 5.00 
𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙 Product age (in years) 2,851 0.60 1.01 0.00 11.23 
𝐿𝑙𝑚 Consumer loyalty 2,851 3.52 0.06 3.36 3.62 
𝑆𝑙𝑚 Consumer search before purchase 2,851 0.16 0.04 0.12 0.29 
𝑀𝑗𝑙𝑚 Percent of models offered by firm j 2,851 0.21 0.10 0.02 0.56 
𝐼𝑙𝑚 Consumer income (in $10,000) 2,851 5.84 1.04 4.48 8.19 
 (* They are shown to be zero because of truncation.) 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑚𝑡 𝑆𝑖|𝑙𝑚 𝑆𝑖|𝑗|𝑙𝑚 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙 𝐿𝑙𝑚 𝑆𝑙𝑚 𝑀𝑗𝑙𝑚 𝐼𝑙𝑚 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 1.0000         
𝑆𝑗|𝑙𝑚 0.3885 1.0000        
𝑆𝑖|𝑗|𝑙𝑚 0.3426 -0.1226 1.0000       
𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 -0.0591 -0.1155 0.1068 1.0000      
𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙  0.0725 0.0404 0.1763 -0.0559 1.0000     
𝐿𝑙𝑚  0.0628 0.0911 -0.0473 -0.0699 -0.0402 1.0000 
   
𝑆𝑙𝑚  -0.0887 0.0108 0.0976 0.0911 0.0745 -0.2169 1.0000   
𝑀𝑗𝑙𝑚 -0.0026 0.3239 -0.3376 -0.2836 -0.0023 0.1711 0.0131 1.0000  
𝐼𝑙𝑚 0.0514 0.0740 0.2056 0.1517 0.1371 -0.2114 0.6399 0.1763 1.000 
 
Note that in Equation (10), the price 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 may correlate with the error 𝜉𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚, because 
firms’ pricing decisions can be based on some information in 𝜉𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 that is unobserved to the 
econometrician. Moreover, market shares may also be affected by the unobserved product 
attributes in 𝜉𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚. As a result, both price and market shares can be endogenous in our model. We 
use two sets of instruments to ensure consistent estimates of model parameters. Our first set of 
instruments uses supply-side cost shifters. Standard differentiated-product models predict that 
price is a function of marginal cost, so input prices are often used as instrumental variables for 
prices of end products by prior studies (e.g., Draganska and Jain 2005; Chu et al. 2007). 
Specifically, we use the Producer Price Index (PPI) for CPUs as an instrument. Given that CPU 
is a key input to PC production, the PPI of CPU should be highly correlated with PC prices. On 
the other hand, consumer demand for PCs should not be directly affected by CPU prices after 
accounting for PC prices. As a result, the PPI of CPU should not be correlated with the error 
term in the demand system for PC, making it a valid instrument. We download the PPI data for 
the product category of “Microprocessors” from BLS’s website. Our second set of instruments is 
derived from the observed attributes of related PC models. Berry (1994) shows that the observed 
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attributes of related products are valid instruments for price and within-nest market share in 
discrete choice demand models for differentiated products because these attributes are 
predetermined, or at least determined before consumers’ evaluations of the unobserved product 
attributes are revealed. This type of instruments has been widely used by prior studies (e.g., 
Berry 1994; Berry et al. 1995; Hui 2004; Zhu and Zhang 2010). Specifially, we use: (1) the sum 
of product age for the other PC models from the same firm with the same form factor in the same 
channel; (2) the sum of product age for the PC models from all the other firms with the same 
form factor in the same channel. To ensure that we have a sufficient number of instruments, we 
interact these two sets of instruments with the combination of firm, form factor, and channel 
dummies during the estimation process (Chu et al. 2007; Hui 2004). We have multiple 
endogenous variables and therefore multiple first-stage regressions. The average first-stage R2 is 
0.6942 and adjusted-R2 is 0.6813. 
A linear model with instrumental variables is typically estimated using a standard two-
stage least squares (2SLS) procedure. However, given the logistics transformations applied on 
𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 and 𝜌𝑙𝑚, the 2SLS estimation procedure is not applicable in our nonlinear setup. Therefore, 
we use a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. The detail of the GMM estimator is 
in Appendix B.  
2.6 Results 
2.6.1 Cannibalization and Competition Effects 
Table 3 shows our estimation results. Model M1 corresponds to the model specified in 
Equation (10) with 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 and 𝜌𝑙𝑚 replaced with Equations (11) and (12) respectively. The 
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parameter estimates allow us to calculate the average intra-brand cannibalization and the average 
inter-brand competition for both online and offline markets. 
Table 3: Estimation Results 
 
  M1 M2 M3 
 Description 
No Consumer 
Preference Variables 
(GMM) 
Main Model 
(GMM) 
Linear Link Function 
(2SLS) 
Utility function        
𝛼𝑝(𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚) Price -0.8291 *** -0.3460 *** -0.3222 *** 
𝜑1(𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙) Product age 0.0122 * 0.0134 *** 0.0106 *** 
𝜑2(𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙
2 ) Squared product age -0.0002 * -0.0003 *** -0.0003 ** 
Competition        
𝛾1(𝐿𝑙𝑚) Consumer loyalty   -6.7689 *** -0.3172 *** 
𝛾2(𝑆𝑙𝑚) Consumer search   6.4832 ** 0.3068 ** 
Cannibalization        
𝛽1(𝐿𝑙𝑚) Consumer loyalty   -13.5006 *** -1.4939 *** 
𝛽2(𝐼𝑙𝑚) Consumer income   -9.8615 *** -1.0730 *** 
𝛽3(𝐿𝑙𝑚 ∗ 𝐼𝑙𝑚) Consumer loyalty * income   2.2664 *** 0.2559 *** 
𝛽4(𝐿𝑙𝑚 ∗ 𝐼𝑙𝑚
2 ) Consumer loyalty * squared income   0.0545 *** 0.0048 *** 
𝛽5(𝑆𝑙𝑚) Consumer search   14.3093 *** 1.5700 *** 
𝛽6(𝑀𝑗𝑙𝑚) Percent of models offered by firm j   1.3033 *** 0.1384 *** 
Observations  2,851 2,851 2,851 
Note: * p-value<.05; ** p-value<.01; *** p-value<.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. Due to space limitation, 
we have omitted all the coefficients for dummy variables included in Equations (10) - (14), including firm dummies, 
interactions of form factor and channel dummies, CPU category dummies, and yearly dummies. 
 
To estimate the difference in cannibalization effect, we first substitute the estimated form 
factor, channel, and brand dummies into Equation (11) and calculate the cannibalization effects 
σjlm for all the form factor-channel-vendor combinations (listed in Table 4). Then we report the 
difference in average σjlm between online and offline channels. Given that we use nonlinear 
functions of the estimators to calculate the difference, the p-value is computed based on a Wald 
test statistic. To estimate the difference in competition effect, we first substitute the estimated 
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form factor and channel dummies into Equation (12) and calculate the four ρlm, one for each form 
factor and channel combination (listed in Table 5). We then report the difference in average ρlm 
between online and offline channels. Again this difference involves nonlinear functions of the 
estimators. We compute the p-value based on a Wald test statistic. We find that the online market 
has both higher cannibalization (difference = 0.0722, p-value < 0.001) and higher competition 
(difference = 0.0460, p-value < 0.001) than the offline market. This answers our first research 
question by showing that both cannibalization and competition differ across online and offline 
markets.  
Table 4: Cannibalization Parameter for Each Sub-Nest from Model M1 
Vendor Form factor Online Offline Online - Offline 
Acer Desktop 
0.9249 
(0.0165) 
0.7583 
(0.0252) 
*** 
Acer Notebook 
0.7574 
(0.0047) 
0.6292 
(0.0337) 
* 
Apple Desktop 
0.9223 
(0.0047) 
0.7214 
(0.0222) 
 
Apple Notebook 
0.7459 
(0.0594) 
0.6629 
(0.0718) 
 
Dell Desktop 
0.9740 
(0.0025) 
0.8659 
(0.0065) 
*** 
Dell Notebook 
0.8946 
(0.0200) 
0.6924 
(0.0259) 
 
Gateway Desktop 
0.9653 
(0.0140) 
0.8621 
(0.0200) 
*** 
Gateway Notebook 
0.8750 
(0.0337) 
0.8016 
(0.0355) 
* 
HP Desktop 
0.9496 
(0.0086) 
0.8030 
(0.0137) 
*** 
HP Notebook 
0.8225 
(0.0216) 
0.7537 
(0.0294) 
* 
Lenovo Desktop 
0.9767 
(0.0044) 
0.9034 
(0.0077) 
**** 
Lenovo Notebook 
0.8997 
(0.0200) 
0.8523 
(0.0205) 
* 
Sony Desktop 
0.5055 
(0.0107) 
0.1878 
(0.0111) 
*** 
Sony Notebook 
0.3038 
(0.0807) 
0.2367 
(0.0069) 
 
Toshiba Notebook 
0.9175 
(0.0395) 
0.8726 
(0.0427) 
* 
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Note: * p-value<.05; ** p-value<.01; *** p-value<.001. 
 
 
Table 5: Competition Parameter for Each Nest from Model M1 
 Online Offline Online - Offline 
Desktop 
0.9765 
(0.0223) 
0.9444 
(0.0167) 
* 
Notebook 
0.9587 
(0.0131) 
0.8882 
(0.0222) 
*** 
Note: * p-value<.05; ** p-value<.01; *** p-value<.001. 
 
Model M2 corresponds to the model specified in Equation (10) with 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 and 𝜌𝑙𝑚 
replaced with Equations (13) and (14) respectively. The “Competition” section lists the variables 
included in Equation (14) that affect inter-brand competition, while the “Cannibalization” section 
lists the variables included in Equation (13) that affect intra-brand cannibalization. Using this 
model, we find a similar result to that of Model M1 in that the online market has both higher 
cannibalization (difference = 0.1428, p-value < 0.001) and higher competition (difference = 
0.0557, p-value <0.001) than the offline market.  
2.6.2 Consumer Preferences 
To answer our second research question, our result of Model M2 shows that both brand 
loyalty and consumer search play important roles in influencing cannibalization and competition. 
In terms of cannibalization, the coefficient of brand loyalty is negative and significant (𝛽1 = -
13.5006, p-value <0.01), whereas the coefficient for the interaction of brand loyalty and income 
is positive and significant in both linear (𝛽3= 2.2664, p-value< 0.01) and quadratic terms (𝛽4 = 
0.0545, p-value< 0.01). These estimates suggest that brand loyalty has a negative impact on 
cannibalization if the average income in the market is low, and the impact is positive if the 
average income is high. This is consistent with our earlier argument that brand loyalties of high-
end and low-end consumers can have opposite effects on intra-brand cannibalization. It is 
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therefore important to consider consumer composition before drawing conclusions on the effect 
of brand loyalty on intra-brand cannibalization. 
The coefficient for brand loyalty on inter-brand competition, regardless of income, is 
negative and significant (𝛾1 = -6.7689, p-value<0.01), suggesting that stronger consumer loyalty 
can mitigate the inter-brand competition. It is consistent with the finding in prior literature that 
when consumers are more loyal, they become less price-sensitive and less likely to switch 
between brands (Empen et al. 2011; Krishnamurth and Raj 1991; Raju et al. 1990; Sambandam 
and Lord 1995). 
The coefficient for consumer search is positive and significant for both competition (𝛾2 = 
6.4832, p-value<0.05) and cannibalization (𝛽5 = 14.3093, p-value < 0.01). We compare the 
marginal effects of search on competition and cannibalization and further find that search 
consistently has a higher impact on cannibalization than on competition in both online and 
offline markets (p-value<0.01). Accordingly, consumer preference for more prior-purchase 
search intensifies both inter-brand competition and intra-brand cannibalization. Moreover, more 
active search by consumers before purchase not only facilitates the comparison of products 
across firms but also amplifies the substitutability of products within a firm to a larger extent. In 
addition to the consumer preference variables, the coefficient for 𝑀𝑗𝑙𝑚 is positive and significant 
(𝛽6 = 1.3033, p-value<0.01), confirming that a relatively long product line tends to induce higher 
product cannibalization.  
As a robustness test, Model M3 shows the results from a 2SLS estimation with linear link 
functions instead of the logistic transformations in Equations (13) and (14). Our main results 
hold qualitatively. 
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Now that we have shown that consumer preference variables have significant impacts on 
both cannibalization and competition, an additional question is: how much variation in 
cannibalization and competition between different markets can be explained by the differences in 
consumer preference variables? Using estimated parameters from Model M2, we calculate the 
differences in competition and cannibalization effects between online and offline channels as 
shown in the first row of Table 6. To see the impact of consumer loyalty and search variables, in 
the second row of Table 6, we assume that there was no difference in loyalty and search 
variables between online and offline channels (by replacing their values with the overall average 
in the market), in which case the differences in competition and cannibalization effects between 
the two channels come from the channel and form factor dummies only. We can see that our 
loyalty and search variables explain 53.32% of the difference in competition effect and 48.25% 
of the difference in cannibalization effect. This finding indicates that our consumer preference 
variables play a critical role in explaining the cross-market differences in competition and 
cannibalization. 
Table 6: Explaining Power of Loyalty and Search Variables 
 Online - Offline 
 Competition Cannibalization 
Loyalty and search variables set at observed values 0.0557 *** 0.1428 *** 
Loyalty and search variables set at overall average values 0.0260 ** 0.0739 *** 
Percentage explained by variations in loyalty and search 
variables 
53.32% 48.25% 
Note: ** p-value<.01; *** p-value<.001. 
 
We also compare the consumer preference variables between online and offline channels 
to draw additional implications on their impacts on the differences in cannibalization and 
competition between the two channels. We find that consumers who buy online tend to search 
significantly more than consumers who buy offline. We do not find a significant difference in 
consumer brand loyalty across channels, but the interaction between loyalty and income is higher 
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in the online channel due to higher income. This suggests that while the overall higher 
competition in the online channel is primarily driven by the difference in consumer search, the 
higher cannibalization in the online channel is driven both by the difference in consumer search 
and by the differential effect of brand loyalty of consumers with different preferences for quality. 
Even though brand loyalty is not statistically different across channels, the higher average 
income of the consumers purchasing PCs online suggests a higher consumer preference for 
quality, ultimately leading to a higher cannibalization in the online channel. 
2.6.3 Discussion 
Our results indicate that online markets exhibit stronger competition and cannibalization 
than offline markets. While prior work in information systems has primarily focused on how 
inter-firm competition differs between online and offline markets, little attention has been paid to 
the difference in intra-brand cannibalization between online and offline markets. However, both 
cannibalization and competition are important to firms’ online strategies. Our main result that 
cannibalization is higher online than offline is consistent with the observation from our data that 
as a firm increases its number of model offerings, its total sales increase at a lower rate in the 
online market than in the offline market, as shown in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3: Model Free Evidence of Higher Cannibalization Online 
 
There are at least two reasons why cannibalization can be higher online than offline. 
First, the online channel has made it a lot easier to search for information. While previous studies 
have examined the impact of lowered search cost on inter-firm competition, we argue that the 
lowered search cost, not only affects competition, but also affects cannibalization. More 
importantly, our result suggests that search in fact can have a higher impact on cannibalization 
than on competition. The Internet has provided an unprecedented scale of information covering 
almost every aspect of the product and has also made it very easily accessible. This without 
doubt intensifies competition between products in the online market, not only across brands but 
also within the same brand. Because of the amount of details available for the products, it also 
possibly makes it easier for consumers to distinguish products from different firms and recognize 
the commonalities between products from the same firm. As a result, while both intra-brand 
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cannibalization and inter-brand competition are higher online, cannibalization could be affected 
more than competition. 
Second, the impact of consumer loyalty on cannibalization can also be different online. 
Consumer loyalty is not necessarily lower online. The online channel offers features like 
personalized recommendations and one-click purchasing etc. that can increase loyalty for time 
conscious consumers. In fact, in our data, we do not find a significant difference in consumer 
brand loyalty across channels, but the interaction between loyalty and income is higher in the 
online channel due to the higher income. The people who are more prone to online purchase in 
the PC market are likely the ones who are more familiar with technology. These people, 
compared to the general population, can be relatively more knowledgeable and quality 
conscious. Because brand loyalty of high end consumers has a positive impact on 
cannibalization, the characteristics of the online population in the PC market make it more likely 
for us to observe a higher cannibalization online. 
Recognizing the importance of both cannibalization and competition for firm’s online 
product strategies, our results also show significant economic impact. For example, we can 
compare the percentage increase in a firm’s total sales after introduction of new products 
between the online and offline channels through simulations. When we run the simulations, we 
assume that all the firms are symmetric and all the products are symmetric. We use the mean 
value for each of our predictor variables to simulate what would happen if one firm increased its 
number of products. Figure 4a shows the percentage increase in sales as a firm increases its 
number of products from 16 (which is the average number of computer models per brand in our 
data) to the number indicated on the X axis. Figure 4b shows the incremental percentage increase 
in sales if a firm increases its number of products by one assuming its original number of 
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computer models is the number indicated on the X axis. Both plots show a significant higher 
increase in sales in the offline channel than in the online channel.  
 
(a) What if the focal firm increases the number of products from 16 to a specific number? 
 
(b) What if the focal firm increases the number of products by 1 from a specific number? 
Figure 4：Comparison between Online and Offline Channels: Percentage Increase in Sales as the 
Number of Products Increases 
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2.7 Robustness Checks 
In this section we explore alternative specifications to check the robustness of our 
findings. First, intra-brand cannibalization can be affected by the number of computer models. 
Therefore, instead of using the ratio of the number of models offered by firm j to the total 
number of models in nest lm, in column M4 of Table 7, we directly use the number of models 
offered by firm j in nest lm (𝑁𝑗𝑙𝑚) to control for the impact of product variety on cannibalization 
and use the total number of models in nest lm (𝑁𝑙𝑚) to control for the impact of product variety 
on competition. Second, as an additional approach to address the concern that search can be 
endogenous since consumers are likely to search more when there are more products, in columns 
M5 and M6 of Table 7, we instrument the search variable in our main model using the total 
number of models in market lm (𝑁𝑙𝑚) and meanwhile we control for the impact of product 
variety in Equation (13) using either the ratio variable 𝑀𝑗𝑙𝑚 or the number of models 𝑁𝑗𝑙𝑚. Third, 
to explicitly control for cross-channel competition within the same form factor, in column M7 of 
Table 7, we modify our two-level nest structure into a three-level nest structure: Level 1 (Form 
Factor), Level 2 (Channel), Level 3 (Vendor) and computer models at the bottom. As shown in 
Table 7, our main results hold qualitatively in all the robustness checks.  
Table 7: Robustness Checks 
  M4 M5 M6 M7 
 Description 
Number of Models 
in Cannibalization 
and Competition 
IV for Search + 
Ratio of Models in 
Cannibalization 
IV for Search + 
Number of Models  
in Cannibalization 
3-Layer Model 
Utility function          
𝛼𝑝(𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚) Price -0.5282 *** -0.4268 *** -0.5386 *** -0.2687 *** 
𝜑1(𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙) Product age 0.0119 *** 0.0133 *** 0.0085 ** 0.0043 * 
𝜑2(𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙
2 ) Squared product age -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001  
Competition          
𝛾1(𝐿𝑙𝑚) Consumer loyalty -7.5026 ** -6.8631 *** -5.2698 * -6.4624 ** 
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𝛾2(𝑆𝑙𝑚) Consumer search 10.5942 *** 6.0018 ** 7.6573 *** 6.4238 * 
𝛾3(𝑁𝑙𝑚) Number of models 0.0091 ***       
Cannibalization          
𝛽1(𝐿𝑙𝑚) Consumer loyalty -13.5496 *** -13.3902 *** -14.1748 *** -13.0430 *** 
𝛽2(𝐼𝑙𝑚) Consumer income -10.2586 *** -9.9123 *** -10.5683 *** -10.7237 *** 
𝛽3(𝐿𝑙𝑚 ∗ 𝐼𝑙𝑚) 
Consumer loyalty * 
income 
2.6050 *** 2.3405 *** 2.5216 *** 2.4542 *** 
𝛽4(𝐿𝑙𝑚 ∗ 𝐼𝑙𝑚
2 ) 
Consumer loyalty * 
squared income 
-0.0373 *** 0.0483 *** -0.0535 *** 0.0582 *** 
𝛽5(𝑆𝑙𝑚) Consumer search 13.4020 *** 15.2805 *** 15.1942 *** 14.4817 *** 
𝛽6(𝑀𝑗𝑙𝑚) 
Percent of models 
offered by firm j 
  1.1467 ***   1.0943 *** 
𝛽7(𝑁𝑗𝑙𝑚) 
Number of models 
offered by firm j 
0.0079 ***   0.0102 ***   
Observations    2,851 2,851 2,851 
Note: * p-value<.05; ** p-value<.01; *** p-value<.001. 
 
2.8 Conclusions 
In this study, we develop a unified GEV framework to simultaneously measure both 
intra-brand cannibalization and inter-brand competition in online and offline markets as well as 
the impacts of search and consumer loyalty on both cannibalization and competition. We find 
that both intra-brand cannibalization and inter-brand competition are higher in the online market 
than in the offline market, suggesting stronger competition between products both within a brand 
and across brands in the online market. While the higher online competition between brands has 
been recognized in academic research and practice, the higher cannibalization between products 
of the same brand in the online market has been largely overlooked. Given the importance of 
both effects in designing optimal product lines, our results highlight the importance for firms to 
consider both effects when practicing the product proliferation strategy online. If intra-brand 
cannibalization is more pronounced, it may be optimal for firms to offer fewer products online. 
This might be the reason why the number of models from HP is consistently smaller in the online 
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market than in the offline market. This can be counter-intuitive since online stores are often not 
limited by shelf space or capacity constraint, and it is generally cheaper to host a greater product 
variety online. However, a shorter product line online may be optimal if the higher intra-brand 
cannibalization online is a major concern.  
Our results also identify demand-side factors that drive cannibalization and competition 
in different markets. Specifically, we find asymmetric effects of brand loyalty on cannibalization 
from consumers with different price sensitivities. While higher brand loyalty of high-end 
consumers can intensify product cannibalization, higher brand loyalty of low-end consumers can 
have the opposite effect. While higher brand loyalty in general mitigates inter-brand competition, 
more active consumer search not only intensifies inter-brand competition but also enhances intra-
brand cannibalization to a larger extent. We also find that the differences in these consumer 
preferences can explain a significant fraction of the variations in both cannibalization and 
competition between different markets. These results highlight the need for firms to consider the 
impact of consumer loyalty and search behavior on both product cannibalization and competition 
when designing their product lines. For example, if the market is mainly composed of loyal 
consumers from the high-end segment, it may be optimal for manufacturers to offer fewer 
products to the market. Perhaps that is why Apple only offers a few iPhone models, while its 
major competitor, Samsung, offers consumers far more options. Since consumer search 
adversely affects both inter-brand competition and intra-brand cannibalization, a lower search 
cost does not necessarily promote longer product lines, which are often considered effective in 
reaching and attracting consumers. The long tail phenomenon may not work well for markets 
mainly consisting of loyal, price insensitive consumers.  
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This study has a number of limitations that provide opportunities for future research. 
First, we focus on the PC industry which is a high-technology durable product category. Future 
research can apply the same framework to examine cannibalization and competition in other 
industries, such as consumer package goods. While the nest structure and the degree of prior-
purchase search or brand loyalty may vary in different industries, the mechanisms by which 
search and loyalty affects cannibalization and competition, and in turn the direction of our results 
on how search and loyalty affect cannibalization and competition are expected to be the same. 
Second, consumer preference is a broad concept and encompasses various dimensions. In this 
study, we look at only brand loyalty and consumer search, and the survey items we use to 
construct our variables also may not fully capture these consumer preferences. It will be 
interesting for future research to examine alternative ways to measure brand loyalty and 
consumer search and to investigate other dimensions of consumer preference and their effects on 
market competition and product cannibalization. Lastly, it would also be interesting for future 
research to incorporate unobserved consumer heterogeneity into the model when examining the 
impacts of consumer preferences on product cannibalization and firm competition. 
  
36 
 
36 
 
Chapter 3 Retail Store Entry and Online Consumer Search: The 
Role of Awareness versus Convenience Effects 
Relatively little research explicitly considers how a firm’s channel decisions affect 
consumers’ tradeoffs between the cognitive costs of online search and the physical costs of 
visiting a retail store. We argue that opening a new retail store affects both cognitive and 
physical search costs, but that the magnitude of these effects depends on the location of the 
consumer relative to the new store, and consumers’ characteristics. As a result, retail store entry 
may shift consumers’ online behaviors differently. We test these ideas by examining how the 
opening of multiple retail stores on the same day by a major retailer affects consumer search 
behavior on the retailer’s website. For consumers with prior experience on the retailer’s 
website, we find that opening a new store leads to a 68% increase in the number of visits to the 
retailer’s website by consumers who live in the broader marketing area of the new store, while it 
leads to a 49% decrease in the number of visits to the retailer’s website by consumers who live in 
the nearby shopping region. More interestingly, the effect of store entry in the shopping region 
on decreasing website search is weaker when consumers are more efficient in using online 
channel. In addition to the total number of online sessions, consumers change their within 
session behaviors after the offline store entry. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Most research on the effect of firm behavior on consumer information search has focused 
on the physical search costs of gathering information (Balasubramanian, 1998; Forman, Ghose, 
& Goldfarb, 2009). Relatively little research considers how firm behavior affects consumer 
tradeoffs between the physical costs of offline search (as determined by the physical effort 
involved in visiting a retail store; (Balasubramanian, 1998; Moorthy, Ratchford, & Talukdar, 
1997) and the costs of online search (as determined by the effort to acquire and process online 
information; (Hoque & Lohse, 1999; Ratchford, Lee, & Talukdar, 2003). We argue that opening 
an offline store can increase or decrease the attractiveness of the retailer’s online store depending 
on where the consumer lives. In other words, we propose that offline stores can have 
complementary as well as substitution effects on online search behavior. For consumers who live 
in the nearby shopping region, store entry can decrease online search by making offline search 
more convenient (a substitution effect). However, for consumers store entry can increase online 
search by creating greater awareness of the retailer’s brand (a complementary effect). Further, 
we propose that the impact of offline store entry depends on consumer-specific characteristics 
such as their efficiency of using the online channel. 
We test these ideas using a unique dataset that combines the online search behavior of a 
representative sample of US consumers, and census data, with information on the opening of 64 
new Kohl’s retail stores in October 2006. We compare changes in the online search behavior of 
consumers living in areas that experience store entry, with that of consumers living in areas with 
no new store openings. In other words, we treat store openings as a natural experiment to 
examine how offline store entry affects online search behavior and how this effect is influenced 
by consumer-specific characteristics. 
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We find that for consumers with prior experience on the retailer’s website, opening a new 
store leads to a 68% increase in the number of visits to the retailer’s website when a new store 
enters the broader marketing area, while it leads to a 49% decrease in the number of visits to the 
retailer’s website when the new store enters the nearby shopping region. More interestingly, the 
effect of store entry in the shopping region on decreasing website search is weaker when 
consumers are more efficient in using the online channel. In addition to the total number of 
online sessions, consumers change their within session behaviors after the offline store entry. 
Although theoretical analyses suggest complementary as well as well as substitution 
effects of adding new channels (e.g., Lal & Sarvary, 1999), empirical research has generally 
found that the offline channel competes with the firm’s online channel (Anderson, Fong, 
Simester, & Tucker, 2010; Goldfarb & Tucker, 2011). In addition, prior research has focused on 
purchase rather than search behavior (Anderson, Fong, Simester, & Tucker, 2010; Avery, 
Steenburgh, Deighton, & Caravella, 2012; Forman, Ghose, & Goldfarb, 2009; Venkatesan, 
Kumar, & Ravishanker, 2007; Zettelmeyer, 2000). Understanding the impact of offline store 
entry on online search is important because many consumers use the Internet to search for 
product information prior to offline purchase (Verhoef, Neslin, & Vroomen, 2007). Extant 
research has also tended to focus on differences in the physical costs of search, as determined by 
the consumer’s location relative to the retailer, rather than accounting for differences in the 
consumer’s prior experience with a retailer and their efficiency in using a particular channel. By 
accounting for factors that affect the costs of online and offline search, we add to prior research 
by identifying when, and for which consumers, opening a physical store has complimentary 
versus substitutive effects on online search behavior.  
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From a managerial standpoint, our results suggest that fears about cannibalization of the 
online market by offline markets may be overstated. Depending on where consumers live, as 
well as their efficiency in using the online channel, store entry may increase online search for 
some consumers while decreasing online search for others. Our results also point to the need to 
consider the online channel when making decisions about the physical channel. Understanding 
how specific types of consumers respond to new store openings has implications for store 
location choices and direct advertising decisions. For example, in addition to considering 
consumer demographics, shopping, and travel behavior when choosing store locations, a retailer 
should account for the potential benefits of attracting consumers who live in the broader 
marketing area to the retailer’s website. Similarly, cross-channel effects of entry decisions should 
be taken into account when assessing the role of each channel in driving sales.  
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
Despite the dramatic growth of the Internet, consumers continue to rely on traditional retail 
stores for the majority of their shopping (US Census2010). Prior research based on interviews 
with consumers suggests that the offline channel is generally preferred to the online channel for 
search as well as purchase (Frambach, Roest, & Krishnan, 2007). Although the Internet offers a 
number of advantages for consumer search, including more detailed product information, greater 
product variety, ease of price comparisons, and the ability to search for products from home 
(Alba et al., 1997; Anderson, Fong, Simester, & Tucker, 2010; Zettelmeyer, 2000), it has several 
disadvantages. For example, evaluating products may be difficult online (Kambil & Van Heck, 
1998; Overby & Jap, 2009). Further, consumers may vary in their ability to effectively utilize the 
online channel (Bapna, Goes, Gupta, & Jin, 2004). Traditional retail stores allow consumers to 
touch and feel products and obtain face-to-face help from a salesperson (Brynjolfsson, Hu, & 
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Rahman, 2009). In addition, through their physical location and investments in real property, 
retail stores enhance awareness and trust that the store will be around in the future to service 
consumer needs (Kirmani & Rao, 2000).  
Consequently, we argue that the effect of store entry on online search is likely to depend on 
how store entry affects consumer awareness of the retailer and the relative convenience of using 
each channel. More specifically, we distinguish between the effects of new store entry on 
consumers who live in the store’s marketing region and effects on consumers who live in the 
store’s narrower shopping area. For simplicity we refer to these as awareness and convenience 
effects, respectively. Marketing regions are larger and defined by high degrees of social and 
economic integration, while shopping areas are smaller and are defined by the distance the 
consumer typically travels to visit an offline store. 
3.2.1 The Convenience Effect 
Prior research suggests that, in the absence of search and travel costs, consumers often prefer 
to visit physical stores (Frambach, Roest, & Krishnan, 2007). In particular, the online channel is 
seen as an inferior channel for product information because of the inability to touch and feel 
products and obtain face-to-face help from a salesperson (Alba et al., 1997; Verhoef, Neslin, & 
Vroomen, 2007). Further, a physical store engenders trust in the retailer by serving as an 
observable signal of quality (Kirmani & Rao, 2000). Although consumers may be willing to 
spend more time traveling for hedonic than utilitarian goods (Okada, 2005), or for greater 
proportional differences in prices (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), there is a point at which the 
costs of traveling to the physical store exceed the perceived costs of obtaining information 
through the online channel. It is well known that consumers primarily visit stores that are located 
in the vicinity of their residence (Bell, Ho, & Tang, 1998; Brynjolfsson & Smith, 2000; Huff, 
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1964). Thus, consumers with a new offline store entry within their narrower shopping area are 
more likely to shift their search for product information from the online to the retail store, and 
therefore less likely to visit the retailer’s online store. 
Hypothesis H1: For households located within the shopping region of a retailer’s new 
offline store, store entry will reduce search at the retailer’s website. 
3.2.2 The Awareness Effect 
Store entry into the marketing region where a consumer lives increases consumer awareness 
of the retailer as the consumer is more likely to see the physical store, be exposed to word-of-
mouth about the retailer from other consumers, encounter references to the physical store in 
Internet and directory searches, and be exposed to advertising for the offline store. For example, 
retailers often run television advertising and produce newspaper circulars in areas where offline 
stores are located (Kohl's Corporation, 2010). In other words, the presence of an offline store 
provides the consumer with greater exposure to vivid information that is more accessible in 
memory and enhances consumer confidence in the retailer (Berger & Mitchell, 1989; Herr, 
Kardes, & Kim, 1991). This should increase the likelihood that the consumer considers the 
retailer when searching for product information online. 
New offline store entry in the consumer’s marketing region should also reduce information 
gathering and evaluation costs associated with consideration. In particular, because exposure to 
the store and its products may be incidental rather than effortful, the presence of a physical store 
should lower the costs and increase the likelihood of gathering information (Shapiro, Macinnis, 
& Heckler, 1997). Incidental exposure should also lower information search costs by allowing 
consumers to use memory-based consideration processes (Nedungadi, 1990); this should also 
enhance the likelihood of consideration (Kardes, Kalyanaram, Chandrashekaran, & Dornoff, 
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1993). Store entry should also reduce the cost of evaluating information (Shugan, 1980) by 
enhancing the consumer’s ability to assess the type of products the retailer offers; this should 
make it more likely for consumers to consider the retailer when searching for product 
information online (Hauser & Wernerfelt, 1990). 
Finally, investing in a new offline store should enhance the consumer’s trust in the retailer by 
serving as an observable signal of quality (Kirmani & Rao, 2000). In addition, since consumers’ 
online behavior may be influenced by other consumers who live in the same neighborhood or zip 
code (Bell & Song, 2007; Forman, Ghose, & Wiesenfeld, 2008; Jank & Kannan, 2005), new 
store entry should allow consumers to learn from the experience of others. The trust engendered 
through physical presence, the ability to talk to “a real person,” and the ability to learn from 
other consumers should make consumers more likely to consider the retailer when shopping for 
products. For all these reasons—greater awareness, greater information accessibility, lower 
evaluation costs, and increased trust—store entry in the marketing region where the consumer 
lives should make consumers more likely to consider the retailer when shopping for products. 
This greater likelihood of being considered should increase consumer search on the retailer’s 
website. 
Hypothesis H2: For households located within the marketing region of a retailer’s new 
offline store, store entry will increase search on the retailer’s website. 
3.2.3 The Moderating Role of Consumer-Specific Characteristics 
In addition to being affected by the consumer’s location relative to the new store, the 
effect of store entry on search behavior should also depend on consumer-specific characteristics: 
the consumer’s efficiency in using the online channel and the consumer’s experience to the 
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retailer. The first should affect the relative reduction in perceived offline versus online search 
costs. The second should affect the awareness effect in considering the retailer. 
We have argued that consumers make tradeoffs between the costs associated with 
searching the online channel and the physical search costs associated with traveling to the 
physical store. We have also argued that, for consumers living in the narrow shopping region of 
the new store, store entry reduces the perceived physical costs of search thereby lowering the 
appeal of visiting the retailer’s website. This effect should be greater for those who face higher 
search costs (i.e., are less efficient) when using the online channel. For such consumers, the 
reduced physical costs of visiting the new retail store are likely to be lower than the costs of 
online search, and they are more likely to substitute online search with visiting the retail store. In 
contrast, consumers who are more efficient at using the online channel are likely to search (and 
shop) online simply out of habit, obtain hedonic benefits from online search, and browse 
multiple retailers online when searching for product information. Such consumers are less likely 
to be affected when a retail store opens in their shopping region. That is, the effect of store entry 
in reducing online search by those living in the shopping region of the store should be weaker for 
consumers who are more efficient in using the online channel.  
Hypothesis H3: The effect of new store entry in the narrow shopping region, on 
decreasing the likelihood of visit to the retailer’s website, will be lower for consumers who are 
more efficient in using the online channel. 
We have also argued that store entry will enhance the awareness of the retailer. That is, 
incidental exposure to the retailer through the offline store increases the likelihood of inclusion 
in the consideration set of the consumer. This effect should be stronger for consumers who have 
not visited the retailer’s website before and were less aware prior to store entry. In contrast, 
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experienced consumers are more likely to already have the retailer in their consideration set, and 
further incidental exposure to the retailer should have less effect on increasing awareness for 
these consumers.  
Hypothesis H4: The effect of new store entry in the broader marketing area, on 
increasing the likelihood of visit to the retailer’s website, will be lower for consumers who have 
used the retailer’s online channel. 
3.3 Data 
3.3.1 Search Behavior 
Table 8 summarizes the data sources used in this research. Our primary data source for 
consumer browsing is the comScore Media Metrix 2006 dataset of website visitations. 
ComScore recruits a large random sample of Internet users (88,814 households in the 2006 
dataset) and installs a program on each user’s computer that tracks their Internet usage over the 
entire year. The data set contains the name of every domain (website) visited, a time stamp for 
the visit, the number of pages visited within the domain, and the total time spent on the domain 
during that visit. Page-level data is not disclosed to protect consumer privacy. The data set also 
contains demographic information for each household in the panel including zip code, income, 
education, number of children, and Internet connection speed. 
Table 8: Data Sources 
Data  Data Source Details 
Consumer Browsing  comScore Media Metrix 2006 Website visitations of 87,773 households over a span of 
one year (2006). Details available at www.comscore.com  
 
Kohl’s store locations 
and store openings 
Manually collected from 
Kohl’s website and news 
sources 
 
The location of 817 Kohl’s stores in 45 states in 2006 
including location of 64 stores that opened on October 5 
and 3 stores that opened on November 15, 2006  
 
Geo-demographic 
Information 
The U.S. Census Bureau 
(http://www.census.gov/) 
Zip code level information, including, including 
percentage of high school graduates, percentage of 
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bachelor degrees, median income, population, number of 
establishments, percentage of female, and population 
density 
 
ComScore data have been used in prior research (Huang, Lurie, & Mitra, 2009; Moe & 
Fader, 2004; Montgomery, Li, Srinivasan, & Liechty, 2004). Unlike server-side logs (Bucklin & 
Sismeiro, 2003; Nicholas, Huntington, Jamali, & Dobrowolski, 2007), or aggregate-level data 
(Forman, Ghose, & Goldfarb, 2009), comScore provides information at the household level over 
time, as well as household demographics, and is not limited to a single domain or website. Since 
the data allow us to observe actual online browsing, we avoid the recall problems associated with 
assessing product search through consumer surveys. 
3.3.2 Store Entry and Location 
To evaluate the impact of offline store entry on online browsing behavior, we focus on 
the simultaneous opening of multiple stores by the well-known retailer Kohl’s. At the end of 
2006, there were 817 Kohl’s stores located in 45 states. Sixty-four of these stores opened on the 
same day, October 5, 2006. Three additional stores opened in mid-November of 2006 and we 
dropped all households in the marketing and shopping regions of these stores from the data set 
because we did not have a sufficient period of post store-entry observations for these households. 
We calculated the distance between the households in the comScore data set and the nearest 
Kohl’s store based on their zip codes. 
We focus on the retailer Kohl’s for two reasons. First, Kohl’s opened a large number of 
new stores on a single day in 2006. This natural experiment allows us to evaluate the impact of 
offline store entry on online browsing behavior while controlling for consumer heterogeneity and 
time-varying effects such as seasonality. Second, most of the products sold by Kohl’s (such as 
shoes, apparel, home furniture and home accessories) can be classified as search goods (Nelson, 
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1970, 1974). This is important since previous research has found important differences in 
consumer online browsing behavior between experience and search goods (Huang, Lurie, & 
Mitra, 2009). In addition, because the Kohl’s website and stores carry almost identical products 
(Kohl’s 2010), the effects we observe are likely due to differences between channels of 
distribution rather than product lines. Further, based on the comScore transaction data, over 90% 
of the online orders at the Kohl’s website in 2006 were for apparel, shoes and similar products. 
The focus on a single retailer and a homogeneous set of products reduces concerns about retailer 
and product-level heterogeneity. 
3.3.3 Online Channel Efficiency 
We capture consumers’ efficiency in using the online channel following Johnson et al. 
(2003), who show that improvements with practice at performing online shopping tasks are 
linear in the log-log space. More specifically, they empirically demonstrate that log(T) = log(B) - 
 Log(N), where T is the time required to complete a task, N is the number of trials, and B is the 
baseline intercept term (Johnson, Bellman, & Lohse, 2003, pp. 63). To capture consumers’ 
efficiency in using the online channel, we define Page_timei as the time required by consumer i 
to cognitively process a page of online information at the beginning of our study period (July 
2006), and we calculate it as follows. We first estimate the iand i coefficients in the equation: 
log(Tiv) = i - i*log(v) through random coefficient models, where Tiv is the time spent per page 
by consumer i during the vth visit to any retailer website in the same genre as Kohl’s during the 
first six months of 2006. We then use the estimated iand i coefficients to calculate the 
predicted time spent per page of online information by consumer i at the start of our study 
period. That is, Page_timei = exp(i + i*log(Ni)) where Ni is the cumulative number of prior 
visits to retailer websites at the beginning of our study period (July 2006) by consumer i. Thus, 
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Page_timei predicts the speed at which consumer i can process a page of online information at 
the beginning of our study period. In our following empirical analysis, we use -1 * 
log(Page_timei) as the proxy for consumer efficiency in using the online channel (Johnson, 
Bellman, & Lohse, 2003), which means the less time used to process the information in one web 
page, the higher efficiency for a consumer.  
3.4 Research Methodology 
3.4.1 Natural Experiment Design 
We take the offline store entry of Kohl’s as a natural experiment to draw inference on 
how consumers change their online behaviors. One of the advantages with natural experiment 
design is that we can control for unobserved events that coincide with the opening of new offline 
stores, but may affect consumer online behaviors. For example, if there were any nationwide 
economic fluctuations, they may intensify or attenuate the effect of new store entry. These 
uncontrolled events do not pose any problems to the identification of treatment effects in our 
natural experiment design because both treatment and control groups will suffer from the same 
effect. In addition, the use of natural experiment allows us to control the seasonal fluctuations of 
consumer search behaviors. It is critical for our study because our data conver the shopping 
season of Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays. 
Empirically, we select and categorize households into two treatment groups and one 
control group based on the entry (on October 5, 2006) of new Kohl’s stores within the shopping 
and marketing regions defined later (details are shown in Table 9). To make the groups as 
comparable as possible, and cleanly assess the impact of store entry, we limit our analysis to 
areas where there were no nearby Kohl’s stores within the marketing region prior to Fall 2006. 
The control group consists of households that did not have any Kohl’s stores within their 
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marketing and shopping regions for the entire year. The first treatment group (marketing entry) 
had no Kohl’s stores within the marketing or shopping regions prior to October 5th 2006, and 
had one or more Kohl’s stores located in their marketing region (but outside their shopping 
region) after October 5th 2006. Likewise, the second treatment group (shopping entry) had no 
Kohl’s stores within their marketing or shopping regions prior to October 5th 2006, but had one 
or more Kohl’s stores located in their shopping (and consequently marketing) region after 
October 5th 2006.  
Table 9: Control and Treatment Groups 
 
Groups 
Number of Stores 
before Oct. 5, 2006 
 Number of Stores 
after Oct. 5, 2006 
Description 
Marketing 
Region 
Shopping 
Region 
 Marketing 
Region 
Shopping 
Region 
Control 0 0 
 
0 0 
No offline stores in the 
marketing or shopping area for 
the whole year 
       
Marketing 
Entry 
0 0 
 
≥ 1 0 
Offline store entry in the 
marketing (but not shopping 
area) in October 2006 
       
Shopping 
Entry 
0 0 
 
≥ 1 ≥ 1 
Offline store entry in shopping 
area (and hence also in the 
marketing) in October 2006 
       
In addition, we separate consumers in our data set into two groups according to whether 
they visited the Kohl’s retail website during 2006.  Our study period consists of the last six 
months (July–December) of 2006 and we use the first six months (January–June) of the year to 
calculate variables related to the consumer’s prior experience at Kohl’s and efficiency in online 
information search.  
3.4.2 Marketing and Shopping Regions 
We define the marketing region of an offline store, which captures the awareness effect of 
offline store presence, according to its distance to consumers. According to the findings by  
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(Zentner, Smith, & Kaya, 2013), the impact of offline store on consumers’ behaviors on the 
retailer’s website diminishes with the distance of the offline store. As a baseline analysis, we use 
50 miles in the definition of marketing region for an offline store, but we have tested our results 
to be robust to alternative distances. This is also the strategy used by (Gallino & Moreno, 2014), 
which assumes the marketing region to be a 50 miles circle centered at the offline store. 
The shopping region of an offline store, which captures the substitution effect of offline store 
presence on online browsing behavior, is determined based on the average distance that a 
consumer is likely to travel to visit an offline store. While distance is widely acknowledged to be 
an important predictor of offline store visits (Bell, Ho, & Tang, 1998; Brynjolfsson & Smith, 
2000), there are few estimates of the average distance that a consumer is willing to travel to shop 
at a store, and such estimates vary by product type and consumer beliefs about travel time (Kang, 
Herr, & Page, 2003; Murdie, 1965). For example, Murdie (1965) estimates that most customers 
purchase shoes (a product category that is similar to the products purchased from Kohl’s 
website) from stores that are located within 10 miles of their residence. The U.S. Department of 
Transportation provides a similar estimate of 7 miles for the average distance a consumer travels 
to shop at a retail store (US Department of Transportation2008). Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) 
estimate that the average distance that a consumer travels to purchase books and CDs is 5.4 
miles, also consistent with a maximum distance of 10 miles to purchase at an offline store. 
Accordingly, we use a distance of 10 miles from the offline store location to define the shopping 
region. Since Kohl’s stores are located in large metropolitan areas, the shopping region is 
contained within the marketing region for almost all households in the sample. 
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3.4.3 Model Specification 
Our primary interest is to understand how an entry of offline store affects consumer 
search in the retailer’s website, and how consumers’ characteristics moderate such a shift in their 
online behaviors. Hence, we include both the indicators for store entry in marketing and 
shopping regions, and their interactions with consumer prior visits and online efficiency in the 
model. Finally we specify the model as: 
1 2
5 7
3 4
6
* * * * * *
   * * * * *                 (1)
it i it it i it i it
it i t i t it
Y SHP MKT PriorVisit SHP PriorVisit MKT
SHP Efficiency Month PriorVisit Month
    
   
    
   
              
In Equation (1), itY  represents the number of visits for consumer i  in week t  on 
Kohls.com. itSHP  is an indicator for the store entry within the shopping region of consumer i , 
which is set to be zero before October 6th. Similarly, itMKT  is an indicator for store entry in the 
marketing region. PriorVisit is another indicator for consumers who have visited Kohls.com 
between January and June in 2006. As a result, 1  and 2  represent the effects of store entry on 
consumers without any experiences on Kohls’s website, while 3  and 4  capture the 
incremental effects for experienced consumers. 5  tests how consumers’ online efficiency 
moderates the effect of store entry within the shopping regions. 6  and 7 capture the 
seasonality effects. In addition, we add fixed effects i  to control for consumer heterogeneity 
from unobserved characteristics, such as income, education, etc. 
3.4.4 Matching 
A possible concern with the nature experiment design is that Kohl’s location choices for 
new offline stores are not random. Although we have partially controlled for individual level 
heterogeneity in Equation (1) through the consumer level constant 𝛽𝑖 since we are using panel 
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data methods. However, there may be systematic differences between consumers in locations 
where Kohl’s opens new stores (the marketing entry and shopping entry groups in Table 2) 
versus consumers in other locations (the control group in Table 2).  For example, retailers are 
more likely to open new stores in regions with more favorable geo-demographic conditions, such 
as more consumers with higher purchase power. Unfortunately, our natural experiment cannot 
rule out the effect of such systematic differences on consumers’ online search behaviors.  
Thus, following the recent research in marketing(Wangenheim & Bayón, 2007), we apply 
matching methods in our empirically study. The objective of matching method is to formulate a 
control group that is as similar as possible to the treatment groups based on covariates that may 
be correlated with Kohls’s store entry decisions and consumer search behaviors. Following 
Avery et al. (2012), we match the control and treatment groups at the zip code level. Our 
matching process involves the following two steps. 
We first construct a large pool of zip codes as the candidates for the control group. This 
pool constitutes of all the areas in America (excluding Alaska and Hawaii) without a Kohl’s 
store throughout the year of 2006. Then we collect the geo-demographic information for all the 
zip codes in the pool, including percentage of high school graduates, percentage of bachelor 
degrees, median income, population, number of establishments, percentage of female, and 
population density. We also include the number of clothing stores and department stores as the 
proxy for competition against Kohl’s in these zip codes. 
Then we quantitatively match each zip code in the treatment group with zip codes in the 
pool created in the first step using all the eight variables as geo-demographic information. 
Because there are various algorithms in applying matching method, and researchers in marketing 
have just applied the matching method in marketing (Wangenheim & Bayón, 2007), there is no 
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conclusive answer to which algorithms is the best. Thus we test four widely used algorithms and 
report the results in the next section. 
The nearest neighbor matching algorithm selects the best zip code in the control group 
pool for each individual zip code in the treatment based on a pre-defined distance measure 
between the two zip codes. Here, the distance measure is based on the probability regression of 
store entry on the eight selected covariates.  
The optimal matching algorithm(Hansen, 2004) is an extension to nearest neighbor 
procedure. While nearest neighbor algorithm tries to find the closest control match for each 
treated unit at each step, it does not try to minimize a global distance measure. On the contrary, 
the optimal algorithm finds the matched control group with the minimum average distance across 
all the matched pairs.  
The full matching algorithm(Hansen, 2004; Rosenbaum, 2002) is a kind of 
subclassification algorithm, which first form subclasses from the candidate pool such that in each 
of them the distribution of (rather than the exact values) of covariates for the treated and control 
groups are as similar as possible. Different from other matching algorithms, a fully matched 
sample is composed of matched sets each of which contains one treated zip code unit and one or 
more control zip codes.  As a result, the full matching procedure tries to use all the candidates 
except those who are outside the range of common support. In addition, full matching is optimal 
which minimizes the estimated distance measure between each treated subject and each control 
subject within each subclass. 
The genetic matching algorithm(Abadie & Imbens, 2006; Diamond & Sekhon, 2013) 
uses the genetic searching technique developed by Abadie and Imbens (2006). This algorithm 
tries to find a set of weights for each covariate such that optimal balance is achieved after 
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matching, where the balance is determined by two different tests: paired t-tests for binary 
variables and a non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for category and continuous variables.  
After matching, we include all the households in the matched zip codes into the control 
groups. With matching method, we can isolate the effect of store entry by ruling out possible 
alternative explanations for the change of consumer search behaviors because of the self-location 
of Kohl’s in their store locations. Table 10 shows the comparison of geo-demographic variables 
before and after the matching. We can see the treatment and control groups are much similar in 
terms of the used covariates after matching.  
Table 10: Comparison of Geo-Information Before and After Full Matching 
 
Mean 
(Treatments) 
Before Matching After Matching 
Mean 
(Control) 
Difference 
Mean 
(Control) Difference 
%High School 82.8045 82.2748 0.5297 82.7625 0.0419 
%Bachelor 18.7841 17.8685 0.9156 18.9450 -0.1608 
Median Income 46411 42184 4227 46525 -114 
Population 12135 9454 2681 12092 43 
# of Establishments 51.5793 44.3650 7.2142 51.1167 0.4625 
# of clothing stores 6.5504 5.6074 0.9431 6.4481 0.1023 
# of Department Stores 0.4107 0.3451 0.0655 0.4078 0.0029 
Population density 661.4314 457.9833 203.4481 727.0021 -65.5707 
%Female 0.5089 0.5049 0.0041 0.5086 0.0003 
 
3.5 Empirical Results 
Table 11 and Table 12 show descriptive statistics for variables in the empirical models 
and their corresponding correlations. Since the data set will be different for different matching 
methods, we list here the summary statistics from the results using full matching algorithm. Our 
empirical analysis is based on the last six months of the year (July–December 2006) with weekly 
time buckets, while browsing data from the first six months (January–June 2006) are 
incorporated in the calculation of consumers’ prior experience on Kohl’s website. 
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics 
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 Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
itY  
Number of visits to Kohl’s 
website in week i 
164,700 0.0068 0.1070 0 10 
itPages  Average pages / visit  164,700 0.0865 2.2408 0 32 
itDuration  Average duration / visit 
(Minutes) 
164,700 0.0395 1.056 0 17 
itSHP  Shopping entry  164,700 0.0778 0.2680 0 1 
itMKT  Marketing entry  164,700 0.2503 0.4332 0 1 
iPriorVisit  Prior visits to Kohl’s website 164,700 0.0421 0.2009 0 1 
iEfficiency  Efficiency in using online 
channel 
164,700 0.3031 0.3386 -0.938 1.364 
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Table 12: Correlation Matrix 
  itY  itPages  itDuration  itSHP  itMKT  iPriorVisit  iEfficiency  
itY  
Number of visits to 
Kohl’s website  
1.00      
 
itPages  Average pages / visit 
0.41 
(0.00) 
1.00     
 
itDuration  
Average duration / 
visit (Minutes) 
0.40 
(0.00) 
0.83 
(0.00) 
1.00    
 
itSHP  Shopping entry 
0.02 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
1.00   
 
itMKT  Marketing entry 
0.03 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.00) 
0.50 
(0.00) 
1.00  
 
iPriorVisit  
Prior Visits to Kohl’s 
website 
0.10 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.37) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
1.00 
 
iEfficiency  
Efficiency in using 
online channel 
0.03 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.00) 
1.00 
Note: Significance levels in parentheses. 
 
Table 13: Number of Visits the Online Store 
 Variable No Matching 
Matching 
Full Genetic Nearest Optimal 
1  itSHP  
-0.0020 
(0.0048) 
-0.0019 
(0.0045) 
-0.0019 
(0.0045) 
-0.0019 
(0.0047) 
-0.0019 
(0.0053) 
2  itMKT  
0.0024** 
(0.0010) 
0.0021* 
(0.0011) 
0.0039*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0020* 
(0.0011) 
0.0013 
(0.0014) 
3  *iPriorVisit SHP  
-0.0312*** 
(0.0082) 
-0.0321*** 
(0.0078) 
-0.0321*** 
(0.0078) 
-0.0321*** 
(0.0081) 
-0.0321*** 
(0.0091) 
4  *i itPriorVisit MKT  
0.0465*** 
(0.0050) 
0.0606*** 
(0.0056) 
0.0408*** 
(0.0060) 
0.0533*** 
(0.0053) 
0.0397*** 
(0.0066) 
5  *it iSHP Efficiency  
0.0116 
(0.0071) 
0.0116* 
(0.0067) 
0.0116* 
(0.0068) 
0.0116* 
(0.0069) 
0.0116* 
(0.0069) 
6  tMonth  Included 
7  *i tPriorVisit Month  Included 
Number of obs. 344,979 164,700 138,375 244,242 151,416 
Number of households 12,777 6,100 5,125 9,046 5,608 
# of Zip codes 
Shopping Entry 130 128 
Marketing Entry 571 566 
Control 2,787 694 517 1,388 694 
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# of Households 
Entry_10 918 916 916 916 916 
Entry_50 2,037 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029 
Control 9,822 3,155 2,180 6,101 2,663 
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Table 13 shows the effects of new offline store entry in the marketing and shopping areas 
on the number of visits to the Kohl’s website. We report the results from four matching methods 
as well as the one using the original data which include all the zip codes without matching. The 
bottom two sections report the number of zip codes and the number of households for the five 
data sets in the estimation. Please notice that some of the zip codes in the treatment groups (with 
shopping entry or marketing entry) are dropped by the matching methods because there are no 
comparable households in the control group. Since all the results are qualitatively similar, the 
following discussion is based on results after applying the full matching method. 
Shopping region entry. We focus on the effect of shopping entry on consumers with prior 
experience on Kohl’s website, because the number of visits cannot decrease from zero for 
consumers who have never search online before. Thus we conduct post estimation of itSHP + 
*iPriorVisit SHP , which is negative and significant using the full matching method (𝛽1 + 𝛽2 =
−0.0340, 𝑝 < .01), indicating that opening a new offline store in the shopping area decreases 
the likelihood of visit to the online store for consumers with prior visits during the first half year 
of 2006. Thus, we find support for Hypothesis H1. Compared to the mean value of number of 
visits per week to Kohl’s website for these customers before the store entry which is 0.0688, the 
effect of new offline store entry in the shopping region means a 49% decrease in the consumers’ 
online search on Kohls’ website. 
Marketing region entry. The coefficient for itMKT  (𝛽3 = .0021, 𝑝 < .10) is positive and 
significant using the full matching method, indicating that opening a new offline store in the 
marketing area increases the likelihood of visit to the online store for both groups of consumers 
with or without prior visits during the first half year of 2006. Thus, we find support for 
Hypothesis H2. Compared to the mean value of number of visits per week to Kohl’s website for 
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all the customers before the store entry which is 0.0046, the effect of new offline store entry in 
the marketing region means a 46% increase in the consumers’ online search on Kohls’ website. 
Consumer efficiency in using online channel. The coefficient for the interaction term 
*i itPriorVisit MKT  is significant and positive (𝛽5 =.0016, p < .10) indicating that the decrease in 
the likelihood of visit is weaker for consumers who are more efficient in using the online 
channel. Thus, we find support for Hypothesis H3.  As shown in Table (4), the standard 
deviation of efficiency is 0.3386, which means that the increase of one standard deviation in 
efficiency reduces the effect of shopping entry from -0.0040 to -0.0035 (= -0.0040 + 
0.3386*0.0016), a change of 14%. 
Consumer prior experience on Kohl’s website. The coefficient for the interaction term 
*i itPriorVisit MKT  is significant and positive (𝛽4 =.0606, p < .01) indicating that the increase in 
the likelihood of visit is stronger for consumers who have visited Kohl’s website during the first 
half year of 2006. It is the direct opposite of our prediction in Hypothesis H4. One possible 
reason is that these consumers have accumulated enough knowledge on how to use Kohl’s 
website to search product information and make purchases online, thus they would use Kohl’s 
website even more after the store entry in the marketing region. Post estimation of itMKT + 
*i itPriorVisit MKT (𝛽1 + 𝛽2 = .0627, 𝑝 < .01), which means that the effect of new offline store 
entry in the marketing region leads to 68% increase in the search on Kohls’ website for 
consumers with prior online experience compared to the mean value of number of visits per 
week before the store entry for these consumers (0.0917). 
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3.5.1 Analysis on the Within Session Behaviors 
As indicated by Bucklin & Sismeiro (2003), the number of pages within a session is 
another important variable characterizing consumer online search besides the number of visits, 
which represents the amount of information gained from one online visit. Thus, we conduct 
another analyses to show a more complete picture of how the offline store entry affects average 
number of pages per visit in the online channel. We replace the dependent variable in Equation 
(1) with the average number of pages per visit, then run the similar regressions for the new 
variables. Table 14 shows the similar results as the number of visits. Specifically, consumers 
with prior experience on Kohl’s website browse less pages per visit after a store entry within the 
shopping region, but search more pages per visit after a store entry within the marketing region. 
For consumers without prior experience on Kohl’s website, a store entry leads them to visit more 
pages. However, we do not find the moderate effect of online efficiency on the effect of 
marketing entry.  
Table 14: Number of Pages per Visit 
 Variable No Matching 
Matching 
Full Genetic Nearest Optimal 
1  itSHP  
0.1724* 
(0.0966) 
0.1751* 
(0.0981) 
0.1751* 
(0.0987) 
0.1751* 
(0.0962) 
0.1751* 
(0.1011) 
2  itMKT  
0.0398* 
(0.0207) 
0.0312 
(0.0245) 
0.0332 
(0.0267) 
0.0403* 
(0.0216) 
0.0356 
(0.0262) 
3  *iPriorVisit SHP  
-0.2789* 
(0.1656) 
-0.2903* 
(0.1684) 
-0.2903* 
(0.1695) 
-0.2903* 
(0.1653) 
-0.2903* 
(0.1737) 
4  *i itPriorVisit MKT  
0.6059*** 
(0.1017) 
0.9459*** 
(0.1211) 
0.5276*** 
(0.1301) 
0.7739*** 
(0.1071) 
0.1928*** 
(0.1251) 
5  *it iSHP Efficiency  
-0.1517 
(0.1442) 
-0.1519 
(0.1464) 
-0.1519 
(0.1474) 
-0.1519 
(0.1437) 
-0.1519 
(0.1510) 
6  tMonth  Included 
7  *i tPriorVisit Month  Included 
Number of obs. 344,979 164,700 138,375 244,242 151,416 
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Number of households 12,777 6,100 5,125 9,046 5,608 
# of Zip codes 
Shopping Entry 130 128 
Marketing Entry 571 566 
Control 2,787 694 517 1,388 694 
# of Households 
Entry_10 918 916 916 916 916 
Entry_50 2,037 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029 
Control 9,822 3,155 2,180 6,101 2,663 
 
3.6 Conclusion and Implications 
Despite the growth of the Internet, traditional stores still account for the vast majority of 
retail sales and retailers continue to open new stores to gain access to new markets. Our results 
show that opening a retail store affects consumer search on the retailer’s website. In contrast to 
prior research demonstrating that offline store entry reduces online purchases (Forman, Ghose, & 
Goldfarb, 2009; Liu, Gupta, & Zhang, 2006), our results show that store entry can both increase 
and decrease online search depending on consumer-specific characteristics that affect the 
cognitive costs of online search. For consumers in the marketing area of a new store, entry 
increases the likelihood of visiting the retailer’s website (a complementary effect); for consumers 
in the shopping region of a new store, entry reduces the likelihood of website visits (a 
substitution effect). Further, we find that the substitution effect of new store entry on online 
search is weaker for consumers who are more efficient in using the online channel. To correct for 
the endogenous selection of store location, we apply newly developed matching methods to 
select comparable control groups in our natural experiment design. 
These results are important because they 1) provide empirical support for the idea that the 
online and offline channels can be complements and not just substitutes (as demonstrated by 
prior research on offline store entry) and 2) highlight the impact of consumer characteristics on 
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the tradeoff between the costs of online and offline search. In summary consumers change their 
online search behavior not only based on offline store entry but also based on the physical 
locations of the entering retailer and their efficiency in using the online channel. 
3.6.1 Managerial Implications 
From a managerial standpoint, these results highlight the need to consider how changes in 
one distribution channel affect consumer behavior in other channels and how this impact 
depends on consumer characteristics. In other words, although it seems fairly straightforward 
that opening a new retail store will draw nearby consumers to that store, it is not clear a-priori 
that this will increase use of the website for some consumers (a complementary effect) and 
reduce it for others (a substitution effect). Knowing that store entry will likely reduce use of the 
online channel by consumers in the shopping region while increasing online search by those in 
the marketing region, and that these effects will depend on consumer-specific characteristics that 
affect the search costs, can help managers better understand and allocate online and offline 
resources in a symbiotic and proactive fashion. For example, if many of a firm’s online 
customers live in the shopping region of a new store, a drop in website visits by these customers 
may not be a sign of trouble. Similarly, if many of a firm’s online customers live outside the 
shopping region, but within the marketing region, managers should plan for increased visitations 
by those customers and think of ways to capitalize on this new interest.  
Our results indicate that fears about cannibalization of the online market by offline 
markets may be overstated. Further, our results suggest that, in evaluating returns on retail and 
online infrastructure investments, firms should account for cross channel effects. In particular, 
the offline channel should be given credit for driving online search and the online channel should 
be given credit for facilitating pre-purchase search that likely leads to purchase at the retail store. 
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Our results also have implications for the location of new retail stores. A priori, it is not 
clear whether retailers should open new stores in areas with more or fewer consumers that visit 
their online store. Since the substitution effect of store entry is greater for consumers that are less 
efficient in using the online channel, retailers can choose locations that have a greater 
concentration of such consumers. Clickstream data can facilitate their identification. 
After the opening of a new retail store, managers can better target consumers by taking 
into account the consumer’s location relative to the new store, their loyalty to the retailer, and 
their efficiency in using the online channel. For example, consumers within the shopping region 
of the new store who are less efficient in using the online channel are better targets for the new 
retail store, while those who live in the marketing region (but outside the shopping region) and 
are infrequent visitors to the online store, are better targets for the online store. 
3.6.2 Limitations and Future Research 
Our approach has a number of strengths and limitations. Our quasi-experimental 
approach, in which we look at how multiple store openings on a single day in Fall 2006 by a 
major retailer affects online search at the retailer’s website and compare these changes to those 
for consumers in markets where there was no store entry, allows us to control for seasonality and 
other time-based effects. Our use of fixed-effect panel data models allows us to control for 
consumer heterogeneity. Our use of behavioral data over a six-month period overcomes the 
drawbacks of using self-reported behavior. At the same time, our focus on a single retailer means 
the effects we observe may not be generalizable to other retailers. In particular, the effects we 
observe may be stronger for retailers that integrate their web and retail store strategies to focus 
on a single target consumer and weaker for retailers that focus on distinct consumer segments in 
these different channels. Another limitation is that we only observe online behavior and do not 
63 
 
63 
 
have data on consumer offline behavior. Hopefully future datasets will allow researchers to track 
consumer behavior over time across multiple channels. 
Future research could build on our findings in a number of ways. For example, in 
addition to consumer efficiency in using the online channel, other individual-level factors such as 
overall Internet buying experience, income, and the need the need to “touch” certain products 
prior to purchase (Peck & Childers, 2003) may be important moderators of the effects of store 
entry on online consumer behavior. Although we focus on store entry, other research could 
examine the effects of other interventions such as store closings, cross-channel advertising, and 
new product introductions in the retail store on online search behavior.   
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Chapter 4 Technology and Market Structure: An Empirical 
Analysis of Entry and Exit in the Banking Industry  
Most U.S. banks started to offer Internet banking in late 1990s. Since then the retail 
banking industry expected to substitute the costly branch network with the far more cost-efficient 
Internet channel. However, we find that the expansion of online banking did not reduce the total 
number of brick-and-mortar branches, and furthermore, large, national banks expanded their 
branch network at the cost of small, local banks. Using detailed data on branch location and 
performance, we estimate a dynamic entry/exit model to investigate the relationship between the 
technology advancement and the market structure evolution. Our findings suggest that the 
advent of online banking has provided significant competitive advantages to large banks over 
small banks. Specifically, large banks are in a better position to take advantage of the increasing 
residential broadband penetration rate by investing more in online banking services, and hence 
improve efficiency and reduce the costs in operating offline branches. Our model can 
disentangle how different factors contribute to the market structure evolution. Through 
counterfactual simulations, we show that the reduction in operating costs for large banks is the 
most significant factor driving the recent change in the U.S. banking industry, followed by 
increased entry costs and increased deposits due to greater online presence. 
4.1 Introduction 
Technological improvement is one of the fundamental determinants of market structure 
evolution (Schumpeter, 1942a). Besides improving productivity and lowering operating costs 
(Casolaro & Gobbi, 2007; Thatcher & Oliver, 2001), a new technology may also help firms 
increase demand by identifying consumers unsatisfied with the current technology (Schmookler, 
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1966), entering new potential markets (Vernon, 1966), or gaining first-mover advantages over 
competitors (Powell & Dent-Micallef, 1997). Following Schumpeter’s idea that appropriability 
from technology increases more than proportionally with firm size, economists generally believe 
that technology improvements are scale-increasing and leads to an increase in market 
concentration. However, some researchers argue that smaller firms may benefit more from the 
changing technology because they are more adaptive to turbulent environments, and moreover, a 
new technology may facilitate industrial specialization, which can also be more beneficial to 
smaller firms (Baumol, Blinder, & Wolff, 2003). 
The dissensus in the theoretical literature has inspired a large amount of empirical 
research on the relationship between technology progress and market structure (Brynjolfsson, 
Malone, Gurbaxani, & Kambil, 1994; Feng & Serletis, 2010; Ferrier & Lovell, 1990; Green, 
Harris, & Mayes, 1991; Maloney, 2001; Mansfield, 1983). Interestingly, existing empirical 
evidence has been mixed. According to Mansfield (1983), technology changes may lead to a 
decrease in concentration in some major industries, despite that economists tend to view it as a 
concentration-increasing force. Additional empirical evidence is needed to examine how 
technological changes in a particular industry impact large versus small firms, and what factors 
drive this impact. 
In this research, we develop an estimable econometric model of dynamic discrete game in 
the spirit of Ericson and Pakes (1995b). Using data on exogenous technology changes, our model 
of dynamic entry/exit can help us address some common issues in the previous literature. First, 
most empirical studies estimate economies of scale from a new technology by using a time-trend 
index on cost (Daly & Rao, 1985; Green, Harris, & Mayes, 1991; Hunter & Timme, 1991; 
Maloney, 2001; Murray & White, 1983) or on production (Feng & Serletis, 2010; Ferrier & 
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Lovell, 1990; Kumbhakar, 1987) for active firms in the market. They generally focus on the 
effect of technology-induced efficiencies on the evolution of firm sizes, but in large part pay 
little attention to the effect of technology changes on firm entry or exit, which motivates us to 
develop a dynamic entry/exit model in this research. Second, the prior literature often focuses on 
internal technological innovations and firms’ incentives to invest, in which case both technology 
and market structure affect each other and hence evolve endogenously. Our empirical strategy 
circumvents this simultaneity issue by using an exogenous source of technology change to 
identify the effect of technology on market structure. 
We apply the model to study the U.S. banking industry and evaluate how its market 
structure is affected by the increasing penetration of residential broadband Internet connections, 
an exogenous technology change driven by industries other than banking. Despite increasing 
broadband penetration and adoption of online banking, the total number of brick-and-mortar 
branches in the U.S. has remained stable in recent years. This phenomenon is intriguing because 
it contradicts the conventional wisdom that the Internet channel cannibalizes the offline channel. 
In particular, as consumers switch their banking activities from offline to online channels, the 
number of branches is expected to decrease, as has happened in the book retailing industry 
(Goldmanis, Hortacsu, Syverson, & Emre, 2010) and the newspaper industry (Deleersnyder, 
Geyskens, Gielens, & Dekimpe, 2002). Meanwhile, large banks are continuously expanding their 
branch networks while small bank networks are shrinking, leading to a higher concentration in 
the overall banking industry. 
Drawing on the previous literature, we separate the effect of technology changes on 
market structure evolution into three factors: demand, operational efficiency, and entry cost. 
First, on the demand side, online banking offers customers an alternative channel with increased 
67 
 
67 
 
convenience, higher accessibility and reduced waiting time (Bitner, Brown, & Meuter, 2000; 
Curran, Meuter, & Surprenant, 2003), effectively lowering transaction costs from customers’ 
perspectives (Campbell & Frei, 2010). Also, online banking can better satisfy customer needs by 
allowing customers to have more control over the service delivery (Dabholkar, 1991). As a 
result, online banking customers have been found to be more loyal with higher retention rates 
(Campbell & Frei, 2010) and tend to maintain higher asset and liability balances (Hitt & Frei, 
2002), which lead to an increase in market share for banks with better online services (Campbell 
& Frei, 2010). Second, online banking is widely believed to have the potential to increase banks’ 
operational efficiency when customers switch transactions from the offline to online channel. For 
example, online banking allows customers to serve themselves without face-to-face interactions 
with bank employees in the branches. It is estimated that the cost to process an account transfer 
can be as low as $0.01 with online banking compared to $1.07 in a branch (Hitt, Xue, & Chen, 
2007). Finally, offering online banking services may require a larger amount of investment to 
open a branch (Advisors, 2001), e.g., on better IT infrastructure and additional training to 
employees. 
Our econometric model enables us to identify how the broadband penetration affects 
demand and cost factors separately. We find that these effects are asymmetric for firms with 
different sizes. Although large banks pay higher entry costs than smaller banks, they benefit from 
online banking in the long run through significant reduction in their operating costs and increase 
in consumer deposit demand. Our counterfactual experiments show that the effect of broadband 
penetration on operating costs of large banks is the most important factor driving the recent 
market structure change in the U.S. banking industry, followed by its effects on entry costs and 
deposit demand. 
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Our research makes important contributions to the existing literature. First, we add to the 
literature on technology and market structure by offering a framework that disentangles how 
technology changes affect different factors that drive market structure evolution. Such a 
framework is general enough to be applied to various industries, so that researchers can use it to 
examine why technology is scale-increasing in some industries but scale-decreasing in others. 
Second, we empirically explain how the market structure of the U.S. banking industry evolved in 
recent years in response to the diffusion of broadband residential Internet connections. Our 
results highlight the tradeoff between immediate investment on higher entry costs and long-term 
benefit in lower operating costs. A pure myopic static model or a model focusing on production 
efficiency only cannot fully characterize the dynamic tradeoff in this industry. 
4.2 Literature Review 
Our research is built on several streams of existing literature. First, this study is closely 
related to the research on technology progress and its impact on the efficiency improvements in 
financial services, which has a long history in economics and finance literature. This stream of 
literature has been dominated by the estimation of cost (Altunbas, Goddard, & Molyneux, 1999; 
Hunter & Timme, 1991; Lang & Welzel, 1996; Mckillop, Glass, & Morikawa, 1996) or 
production functions (Feng & Serletis, 2010; Ferrier & Lovell, 1990). Theoretically, these two 
approaches are equivalent under certain regularity conditions, as shown by Shephard’s (1953) 
famous duality theorem. Most studies in this research stream have documented scale-increasing 
effects of technology in the banking industry of various countries. For example, Hunter and 
Timme (1991) find that technology progress leads to a 1% annual decrease in the production cost 
of U.S. banks from 1980 to 1986, and larger banks benefit more from technological changes than 
smaller banks. Other researchers have found similar scale-increasing effects of technology for 
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the banking industry in Japan (Mckillop, Glass, & Morikawa, 1996) and European countries 
(Altunbas, Goddard, & Molyneux, 1999; Maudos, Pastor, & Quesada, 1996). In contrast, Lang 
and Welzel (1996) find a larger reduction in production cost for smaller banks with data from 
German cooperative banking industry. Our paper extends this literature by offering a framework 
that decomposes the scale-increasing effects of online banking into demand and cost factors that 
drive the market structure evolution. Also, we focus on a specific technology progress, whereas 
previous studies typically estimate the effect of technology as the derivative of the cost or 
production function with respect to a time trend variable, which may reflect the progress in 
information and telecommunication technologies, financial innovations, demographic changes in 
local markets, etc. 
The prior literature generally limits its focus to changes in firm sizes but, in large part, 
pays little attention to changes in the number of firms in the market. It is not enough to focus 
only on the distribution of firm sizes only, because firms’ entry/exit decisions are at least equally 
important when studying how the market structure evolves over time. To address this issue, 
researchers have developed entry/exit models to explicitly take into account the change in the 
number of banks and branches. For example, Nam and Elliger (2008) estimate a nested logit 
model using the U.S. banking data between 2003 and 2006. They find that bank size, structure, 
and market characteristics are important factors related to bank’s branch expansion. De Elejalde 
(2009) estimates a dynamic entry model to compare the operating profit and sunk cost of entry 
between large multi-market banks and single-market banks. His results show that single-market 
banks pay a higher entry cost, but enjoy a higher operating profit than multi-market banks. Our 
research uses a similar methodology, but focuses on the role of technology advancement in 
affecting different factors related to branch entry/exit, such as operating and entry costs. 
70 
 
70 
 
Another stream of related literature studies the relationship between IT investment and 
productivity (Beccalli, 2007; Brynjolfsson, 1993; Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2000; Brynjolfsson, 
Malone, Gurbaxani, & Kambil, 1994; Hernando & Nieto, 2007; Hitt & Brynjolfsson, 1996), but 
the results are far from conclusive. Hitt and Brynjolfsson (1996) find that IT investment has a 
positive effect on the productivity for 370 large firms. Others find IT investment has little 
relationship with the improvement of bank performance (Beccalli, 2007; Hernando & Nieto, 
2007). But none of them studies the impact of IT investment on market structure with one 
exception from Brynjolfsson et al. (1994), which finds that IT investment is associated with a 
decrease in firm size in America since 1975. One difficulty in these empirical studies of IT 
productivity is that IT investment may be endogenous – more profitable firms may have more 
resources and incentives to invest on IT infrastructure. To circumvent such issues, our 
measurement of technology advancement is exogenous to the focal banking industry. 
4.3 The U.S. Banking Industry 
A bank is a financial intermediary that accepts deposits and makes loans. In the U.S., the 
banking industry is one of the largest sectors in the economy, which accounted for 7.2% of the 
country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) when combined with insurance firms in 2013 (Bea, 
2013) . With over 7,000 banks and 66,000 branches in 2013, the U.S. banking industry is said to 
be the largest one in the world in terms of the number of banks. Further analysis shows that the 
banking industry is very fragmented with the co-existence of a large number of small to medium 
size institutions and a few very large banks. 
The U.S. banking industry is also the most heavily regulated in the world (Besley & 
Brigham, 2011). The key regulators include the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve systems (FRS), and 
71 
 
71 
 
state bank regulators (Saunders, 2000). Historically, the state regulators played a critical role in 
interstate branching restrictions which prohibited a bank to operate across states, because a state 
received no charter fees from banks incorporated in other states. In 1994, the congress passed the 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (RN Act), removing barriers to 
opening bank branches across state lines. 
Technology has long been regarded as one of the most important drivers to the market 
structure change in the banking industry (Ecb, 1999). In terms of information technology, the 
banking industry represents the highest proportion of investment at the industrial level in this 
country (Advisors, 2001). Traditionally, banks offer their services to customers through brick-
and-mortar branches. More recently, with the rapid diffusion of broadband Internet connections, 
banks offer online banking as an alternative channel to branches for most of their services, such 
as funds transfer, bill payment and account management. Since its first inception in New York 
(Cronin, 1997), online banking has grown into a widely used tool with about 47% of American 
adults paying bills online in 2009 (Whitney, 2009).  
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4.4 Data 
We construct a yearly panel data set for the period of 2008 to 201310, including 
information on the market structure change, bank branch performance, and broadband 
penetration rate in each market. 
4.4.1 Sample Markets 
Following Seim (2006), we define banking markets based on the concept of place from the 
Census Bureau, which is basically "a concentration of population"11. In addition, a market should 
satisfy the following two criteria: (1) It should be large enough and isolated from neighboring 
markets, so that consumers generally do not use financial services from banks outside the local 
market; (2) It should be small enough so that there are no submarkets within the local market. To 
satisfy the first criterion, we first merge places with common boundaries using Topologically 
Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing (TIGER) geodatabases for all places in 
America12, because not all Census places are isolated from each other. Then, we choose 
candidate markets from places after boundary merging whose: (a) largest neighboring place 
within 10 miles has a population in 2010 no more than 15,000; (b) largest neighboring place 
within 20 miles has a population in 2010 no more than 30,000; (c) population in 2010 is greater 
than 1,400. The distances between two places are calculated using their population weighted 
centroids. To satisfy the second criterion, we select places with a population no more than 50,000 
in 2010. 
                                                 
10 We focus on the period of 2008 to 2013 because FCC began to publish tract level residential broadband 
penetration rate data from 2008. 
11 https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/gtc/gtc_place.html 
12 http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/tiger-geodatabases.html 
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In addition, we drop markets with multiple branches from the same bank. The two isolated 
states, Alaska and Hawaii, are dropped from our sample. Our final sample consists of 1,104 local 
markets. Error! Reference source not found. Figure 5 is a map of the U.S. with identified local 
markets in red. The map shows that our sample covers almost all the states in the country, with 
more representation of the South and Midwest regions. 
 
Figure 5. Spatial distribution of the sample markets 
We collect market-level demographic data from the U.S. Census Bureau. The income 
information is drawn from American Community Survey (ACS)13, while the population 
information is obtained from Census City and Town Intercensal Estimates14. Table 15 shows the 
descriptive statistics of population and income in 2010. The table shows that the local markets in 
our sample are generally small, but with substantial variation in income and population.  
Table 15. Summary statistics of demographic variables 
Variable Obs.  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median 
Income 1,104  18,990 5,527 3,367 101,244 18,586 
Population 1,104  3,723 2,993 1,448 35,180 2,730 
 
                                                 
13 http://www.census.gov/acs/www/ 
14 http://www.census.gov/popest/ 
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4.4.2 Banks and Branches 
Our bank and branch level data contain information on all the commercial banks and 
thrifts in the U.S. during the period of 2008 - 2013. We obtain the data set from the Summary of 
Deposits (SOD) from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which is a U.S. 
government corporation responsible for insuring deposits, examining and supervising financial 
institutions, and managing receiverships. SOD is an annual survey of branch office deposits for 
all institutions insured by FDIC. It contains detailed branch level information as of June 30th in 
the reported year, including ownership, deposits, and location. We use this data set to construct 
branch entry/exit decisions in local markets and the performance of active branches. To map the 
addresses of branches to our identified local markets, we use Google Geocoding API15 and 
Yahoo BOSS PlaceFinder API16 to translate the reported text-based addresses to their 
corresponding latitudes and longitudes, which can be processed directly by ArcGIS Geographic 
Information System. 
Table 16 and Figure 6 show that the total number of branches is relatively stable from 
2008 to 2013. However, the pattern is asymmetric for large and small banks. The total number of 
branches for large banks, which we define as those with total deposits more than 1 billion U.S. 
dollars, increased by 4.35% from 2008 to 2013, but meanwhile this number decreased by 15.62% 
for small banks. We see a similar pattern in our sample markets as indicated by Table 17.  
Table 16. Changes in the number of branches for all the markets 
 Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
All banks        
                                                 
15 https://developers.google.com/maps/documentation/geocoding/ 
16 https://developer.yahoo.com/boss/placefinder/ 
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 Number of branches 98,239 98,653 97,671 97,397 96,546 95,563 
 Change from last year  414 -982 -274 -851 -983 
 Percentage change from last year  0.42% -1.00% -0.28% -0.87% -1.02% 
Large banks       
 Number of branches 63,429 64,789 64,956 65,964 66,142 66,191 
 Change from last year  1,360 167 1008 178 49 
 Percentage change from last year  2.14% 0.26% 1.55% 0.27% 0.07% 
Small banks       
 Number of branches 34,810 33,864 32,715 31,433 30,404 29,372 
 Change from last year  -946 -1149 -1282 -1029 -1032 
 Percentage change from last year  -2.72% -3.39% -3.92% -3.27% -3.39% 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Changes in the number of branches 
 
Table 17. Changes in the number of branches for the sample markets 
 Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
All banks        
 Number of branches 2,784 2,787 2,795 2,802 2,794 2,784 
 Number of Entrants 62 81 55 50 54  
 Number of Exits 69 73 48 58 64  
 Net Percentage change from last year  0.11% 0.29% 0.25% -0.29% -0.36% 
Large banks        
 Number of branches 1,159 1,192 1,206 1,227 1,241 1,253 
 Number of Entrants  41 41 30 32 36  
 Number of Exits 8 27 9 18 24  
 Net Percentage change from last year  2.85% 1.17% 1.74% 1.14% 0.97% 
Small banks        
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 Number of branches 1,625 1,595 1,589 1,575 1,553 1,531 
 Number of Entrants 21 40 25 18 18  
 Number of Exits 51 46 39 40 40  
 Net Percentage change from last year  -1.85% -0.38% -0.88% -1.40% -1.42% 
 
 
4.4.3 Broadband Penetration 
Our data on broad band penetration is drawn from the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) Form 477, "Local Telephone Competition and Broadband Reporting"17. All 
providers of broadband connections to end user locations are required to file the FCC Form 477 
semi-annually. This form contains information on the number of broadband connections per 
1,000 households. According to the FCC, an Internet access service is defined as broadband if it 
is faster than 200 kbps in at least one direction. We map the Census tract level penetration data to 
Census place level using weighting matrix from Missouri Census Data Center18.  
Table 18 presents the average broadband penetration rate of our sample markets. To 
summarize the findings in Error! Reference source not found. and Error! Reference source 
not found., we observe the following patterns from 2008 to 2013: (1) Broadband penetration 
increased by 51.65%; (2) The number of branches increased by 6.53% for large banks but 
decreased by 5.99% for small banks.  
Table 18. Broad band penetration 
Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2008 1104 0.3419 0.1800 0.00 0.90 
2009 1104 0.3927 0.1898 0.00 0.90 
2010 1104 0.4294 0.1963 0.10 0.90 
2011 1104 0.4800 0.1684 0.00 0.90 
2012 1104 0.5160 0.1647 0.10 0.90 
                                                 
17 http://transition.fcc.gov/wcb/iatd/comp.html 
18 http://mcdc2.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr12.html 
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4.4.4 Descriptive Analysis 
Table 19 presents the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) for bank level deposits. We can 
see that HHI was very stable at the Census place level but increased by 75% at the national level 
from 2008 to 2013. This pattern implies that large banks were entering more local markets 
during the period. 
Table 19. HHI of bank level deposits 
 
Year National All Census places Sample Markets 
2008 0.0230 0.6750 0.6235 
2009 0.0286 0.6733 0.6208 
2010 0.0335 0.6746 0.6193 
2011 0.0367 0.6737 0.6182 
2012 0.0373 0.6734 0.6207 
2013 0.0387 0.6743 0.6255 
 
 
The primary objective of this study is to investigate how the exogenous change in 
broadband penetration rate affects the market structure in the U.S. banking industry. As a first 
step, we conduct reduced form analyses to find out how the increase in broadband penetration 
rate is correlated with the changes in branch numbers. Specifically we run regression analyses 
using three different dependent variables: the percentage of branches belonging to large banks; 
the number of large bank branches; and the number of small bank branches. We include market 
fixed effects to control for unobserved characteristics in local markets. Table 20 shows the 
results. 
Table 20. Regression analyses on the number of branches and broadband penetration 
  % of Large Branches # of Large Branches #of Small Branches 
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Penetration  
0.0496*** 
(0.0122) 
0.1264*** 
(0.0260) 
-0.1152*** 
(0.0307) 
Population 
(10,000) 
 
0.1036 
(0.1324) 
0.4081 
(0.2814) 
-0.9840*** 
(0.3326) 
Income 
($10,000) 
 
0.0402*** 
(0.0120) 
0.0669*** 
(0.0254) 
-0.0068 
(0.0301) 
Market fixed 
effects 
 included included included 
Obs.  5,482 5,520 5,520 
R-squared  0.9452 0.9731 0.9526 
 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. 
 
The broadband penetration rate is positively correlated with the percentage of large bank 
branches (coef. = 0.0496, p < 0.01) and the number of large bank branches (coef. = 0.1264, p < 
0.01), but negatively correlated with the number of small bank branches (coef. = -0.1153, p < 
0.01). This asymmetry seems to suggest that broadband penetration plays an important role in 
driving the recent market structure changes in the U.S. banking industry. However, this simple 
linear analysis reveals no information about how broadband penetration might drive market 
structure changes. In the next section, we set up a structural model to further our understanding 
of this issue. 
4.5 Model 
Our model allows the broadband penetration to affect the market structure evolution 
through its asymmetric impact on large and small banks in terms of deposit demand, operating 
costs and entry costs. We first specify how the single-period deposit demand is affected by 
broadband penetration, and then recover the cost structure through a dynamic entry/exit model. 
In principle, we could develop a structural model of deposit demand if we had direct 
observations on prices (interest rates) and quantities (deposits). However, given that only deposit 
information is available, we follow the prior literature (Berry, 1992; Singh & Zhu, 2008) to use a 
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reduced form specification of deposit demand, which controls for competition effects and 
various market characteristics in a static setup. 
Because we do not observe bank branches’ operating costs and entry costs, we estimate a 
dynamic entry/exit model to recover the cost structure of different branches. The identification 
strategy is to find the set of costs that best rationalizes the branch level entry/exit decisions. 
Estimating the structural model serves another purpose in allowing for the counterfactual 
experiments used to investigate how the increasing broadband penetration rate leads to the recent 
market structure changes. 
4.5.1 Deposit Demand 
To test if branches of large banks earn a deposit premium from higher broadband 
penetration rate after controlling for market characteristics including population and income, we 
regress the deposit amount on these market specific factors as well as the number of competitors 
from large and small banks. Specifically, the deposit to branch i in market m in time period t is 
specified as: 
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Here _
LLog DEP and _
SLog DEP  are respectively the amount of deposits received by 
branches of large and small banks after log transformation. We choose a log-linear regression 
model according to the empirical distribution of branch deposit shown in Figure 7. The left panel 
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is the distribution of deposit before log transformation, and the right panel is close to a normal 
distribution after log transformation. The superscripts L and S indicate whether it is for large or 
small banks. The same convention will be followed hereafter. 
  
Figure 7. Comparing the distributions of deposit and log(deposit) 
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We include market fixed effects MFm to control for persistent but unobserved market 
demand conditions. The observed market characteristics include population POPmt, income 
INCmt, and broadband penetration rate PENmt. The two key parameters are 3
L  and 3
S , which 
capture the effect of broadband penetration rate on the deposit demand. We expect them to be 
significantly different from each other if there exists asymmetric effect of online banking on the 
deposit demand for small and large banks. 
Competition effects depend on the number of competitors in each type, Smtn  and 
L
mtn . 4  
captures the competition effect from the first large bank branch. 5 captures the incremental 
competition effect from the second large bank branch. When the number of competing large 
bank branches is greater than two, we assume their competition effects to increase linearly with a 
coefficient of 6 . Similarly, 7 8 9,  and    are the competition effects from competing branches 
of small banks. Lastly, 
L
imte and 
S
imte  are i.i.d. normal error terms. 
4.5.2 Cost Structure 
Recovering the unobserved cost structure requires a structural model. Our empirical 
framework starts with a dynamic discrete game played by a number of branches in local markets. 
Incumbent branches decide whether to remain active in the market or exit. Potential entrants 
decide whether to enter or stay out of the market. The discrete entry/exit decisions are based on 
the expected discounted flow of payoffs. We learn this expected discounted value and how it 
varies over different states from the observed decisions of different branch types across different 
markets. Specifically, operating costs are identified from the difference in entry/exit probabilities 
for branches under different market conditions, and entry costs are identified from the difference 
between incumbent branches and potential entrants in their probabilities of choosing to be active. 
82 
 
82 
 
By examining the variation of operating and entry costs under different broadband penetration 
rates, we can find out whether large banks are receiving cost advantages from the increasing 
broadband penetration rate in recent years.  
We model bank branches’ entry and exit decisions as a dynamic discrete game in local 
markets, following the spirit of Ericson and Pakes (1995a) and Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry 
(2007). Each market has a set of branches, with branch i characterized by two indicators: 
whether it is an incumbent branch ( itx = 1) or a potential entrant ( itx = 0), and its type (large or 
small bank). Because we do not observe multiple entrants in our data, we assume there is one 
potential entrant of each bank type in each market. Each branch chooses to be active or inactive 
for the next period, and then active branches compete in the local markets.  
Each market is described by a vector of state variables, which determines the branches’ 
payoffs. These state variables are common to all branches in the market. We denote this common 
state vector as mts . It includes population, income, broadband penetration rate, as well as the 
endogenous market structure variables, namely the number of branches of large and small banks. 
In addition, we include the estimated market fixed effects from deposit demand estimation into 
the state vector because it directly affects the payoffs to active branches. 
Besides the market level state variables, branches also observe some private information 
that affects their profits in the coming period. They consider this private information together 
with the common state vector in deciding whether to be active or inactive. The private 
information may include a branch’s managerial ability, and/or fluctuations in market conditions. 
We denote this one-period shock by ( )it ita . 
Denote all the payoff related observed states for branch i as a vector itw , which contains 
a 6×1 vector of common market conditions (smt) and a 2×1 vector of branch status (active or not; 
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large or small banks). Let {0,1}ita   indicate the branch’s decisions on being active or not. The 
one-period payoff is assumed to be: 
 
- -( | , , ) ( | , ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )it it it it it it it it it it itit it it ita w a OR a w a a OC w a x EC w a            (2) 
The private information ( )ita  is assumed to be additively separable. Notably while the 
operating revenue depends on competitors’ decisions, operating and entry costs do not. Because 
the sell-off value of an existing branch cannot be separately identified from operating and entry 
costs (Aguirregabiria & Suzuki, 2014), we normalize the sell-off value to be zero following the 
common practice in literature (Aguirregabiria & Mira, 2007; Collard‐Wexler, 2013; Dunne, 
Klimek, Roberts, & Xu, 2013; Ellickson, Misra, & Nair, 2012). With such normalization, the 
meanings of estimated values for operating and entry costs may change slightly. For example, 
the estimated entry costs are now in fact “ex-ante” sunk entry costs, which equals to the real 
entry costs minus the sell-off value for branches at the same state (Aguirregabiria & Suzuki, 
2014).  
We model branches’ decisions in a game with discrete time and infinite horizon. The 
timing of the game is described as following. At the beginning of each period, both incumbent 
branches and potential entrants observe the market state and draw their private profit shocks. 
Based on such information, incumbent branches decide whether to remain active in the market or 
exit and potential entrants decide whether to enter the market or stay out. Once these decisions 
are made, active branches compete in the local markets, and receive operating revenue OR while 
incurring operating costs OC . New entrants also pay one-time entry costs EC . At the end of 
each period, all the state variables evolve. 
84 
 
84 
 
Operating revenue. We use the estimated deposit demand to derive the operating revenue 
of an active branch. Specifically, we assume that 
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We take the expectation of deposits with respect to 'mts because branch i does not know 
how many branches will be operating at the time of decision making. 0
L  and 0
S measure the 
profitability of large and small bank branches from a certain amount of deposits. These two 
coefficients may be different because, e.g., smaller banks tend to focus on retail banking services 
such as consumer loans and residential mortgages, while larger banks may engage more in 
wholesale banking services such as industrial and commercial lending (Saunders, 2000). 
Operating and entry costs. We specify operating costs OC and entry costs EC to be 
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0
SF  and 0
SF are state fixed effects that capture systematic differences in cost related 
economic factors across states in the U.S., such as regulations for banking industry, tax rates, 
land price, and labor costs. 1
L  and 1
S  measure the effect of broadband penetration ( mtPEN ) on 
a branch’s operating cost. 1
L  and 1
S  could potentially be different from each other, implying 
the effect of broadband penetration on operating costs is asymmetric for large and small banks. 
Similarly, 1
L  and 1
S  capture any possible asymmetric effect of broadband penetration on entry 
costs. 
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Equilibrium. We focus on the equilibrium concept of Markov Perfect Equilibrium 
(MPE). Denote { (w , )}i i i    as the set of strategies with each player’s strategy as a mapping 
: (w , ) {0,1}i i i ia    . Given these strategies, by the principle of optimality, each branch’s 
decision process satisfies: 
     
, 1 , 1, , 1 , 1{0,1}
max Ε, ( | , , ) , | , ,
i t i t
it
i it it it it it it w i i t i t it it iit tV Vw a w a w w a
 

       
      
 (6) 
(0,1)   is a discount factor.19 The value function  V ,i it itw
   is indexed by strategy 
profile  , which implies that it is the value to branch i  when all branches in the same market 
behave according to  . The inclusion of private information in the model guarantees the 
existence of at least one pure strategy MPE, as shown by Doraszelski & Satterthwaite (2010). 
  
                                                 
19 In our empirical estimation we fix the discount factor to be 0.95. 
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4.6 Empirical Strategy 
In this section, we discuss our model assumptions and estimation strategy. Until recently, 
estimating a model of dynamic discrete game has been considered a formidable task. The reason 
is that solving for the equilibrium of the game is too computationally demanding, and the process 
has to be repeated many times for different parameter sets. To make it even worse, the 
equilibrium is not guaranteed to be unique. Due to recent developments by (Aguirregabiria & 
Mira, 2007) and (Bajari, Benkard, & Levin, 2007), two-stage methods have significantly reduced 
the computational burden. In these methods, reduced form entry/exit policy functions are first 
estimated directly from the data. By assuming these policy functions to reflect the equilibrium 
outcome, two-stage methods avoid solving the game fully for every set of parameters 
encountered. These methods have been applied in recent empirical works, e.g., on price 
repositioning in the retail industry (Ellickson, Misra, & Nair, 2012), cost of environmental 
regulation in the cement industry (Ryan, 2012), and demand fluctuations in the ready-mix 
concrete industry (Collard‐Wexler, 2013). Our empirical strategy follows this tradition. In the 
following subsections, we first discuss how we estimate the policy functions, and then how we 
construct the maximum likelihood estimator based on these policy functions. Finally, we discuss 
how we tackle various computational issues, including dimensionality reduction and the 
algorithm for computing the transition matrix. 
4.6.1 Policy Functions 
The first step is the estimation of policy functions governing the entry/exit decisions. As 
shown in Hotz and Miller (1993) and Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), a set of strategies can be 
expressed as its equivalent policy functions or Conditional Choice Probabilities (CCPs). By 
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assuming the private information to follow an i.i.d. Type-I Extreme-Value distribution, these 
CCPs are estimated using a simple Logit model: 
 
exp( )
( 1| w )
1 exp( )
it
it it
it
w
p a
w


 

 
  (7) 
We choose this parametric specification for policy function estimation instead of a non-
parametric frequency estimator because in our data entry/exit decisions are unobserved for many 
states. A similar specification of CCP has been applied in previous literature (Ryan, 2012). To 
make the CCP specification more flexible, we include both linear and quadratic forms of state 
variables into itw . Similar to the operating/entry cost functions, itw  also includes state fixed 
effects. In addition, we estimate two sets of parameters, one for each type of banks, to allow for 
different policies for large and small banks. 
4.6.2 Estimator 
Next we describe the likelihood function for our model estimation. For each possible 
choice of ita , denote its corresponding choice specific value function as: 
  
, 1 , 1
, ( , ) ( | , )Ε
i ti it it it it w i i t ii tt it
v w a Vw w w a   
 
       (8) 
Here ( , )ii t itt w a  is the expected one-period payoff after dropping the private shock in 
Equation (2). 
, 1( | , )Vi i t it itw w a

  is the integrated value function derived by integrating out the 
private shock from the value function in Equation (6): 
  )V ( , )V (i it i it it it itw dgw
        (9) 
The integrated value function is the ex-ante value to the branch in state itw  before the 
private information is revealed. Because the policy functions are the best responses, we can 
rewrite the integrated value function as: 
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 Ε ( , )it it itw a  is the expectation of the private information conditional on the state itw
and that the alternative ita is optimal for the branch. When the private information is Type-I 
Extreme-Value distributed,  Ε ( , )it it itw a  equals to  p(ln | )it itEuler a w  where Euler  is the 
Euler’s constant. 
After discretizing the continuous state variables in itw , the calculation of the integrated 
value function can be written as a set of linear equations: 
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, 1 , 1
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( ) | ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( |) )(
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 
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 (11) 
Here , 1( | )i t itf w w  is the probability density of , 1i tw   given itw . The solution to this 
system of linear equations can be written in vector form as: 
   1
{0,1}
V p( ) ( ) ( ))( )* (
it
it it it itit
a
I aF a a   

     (12) 
 I is an identity matrix. F is the transition matrix for all the state variables, which 
we will discuss in detail later. Given the integrated value function, the choice specific value 
function in Equation (8) is readily available. Our empirical model implies that the optimal 
decision is: 
     
{0,1
*
}
ar) ,g max(
i
i i i i i i iw v w


  

   (13) 
The probability for a branch choosing to be active in the next stage can be written as: 
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  (14) 
Matching this probability to our data, we get the log likelihood for our MLE estimator: 
  * *log ( 1| w ) (1 ) 1 ( 1| w )it it it it it it
t i
ll a p a a p a            (15) 
4.6.3 Computational Details 
In our estimation, the calculation of the integrated value function in Equation (12) 
involves invert the matrix ( )I F . Unfortunately, direct inversion of this matrix is 
computationally infeasible because of its high dimension. Note that our state vector itw  is 8×1. 
After discretization it will result in a huge matrix that needs about 3,564GB of computer memory 
to store.20 To address this high dimensionality issue, we compute 
1( )I F   for each market and 
bank type, because the market fixed effects from deposit demand estimation and the bank type 
are invariant over time. This effectively reduces the dimension of each matrix to 38,880×38,880, 
which needs about 12GB memory and can be handled by a desktop computer. 
Since we need to repeat the inversion for 2,208 times (1,104 markets and two types of 
banks), we take several steps to improve the computational efficiency. First, we program our 
estimation in a low level programming language.21 Second, we use an efficient open source 
library from Basic Linear Algebra Subprograms (BLAS) to compute the inversion. Third, we 
incorporate Intel Math Kernel Library (MKL) into our program, which can optimize the 
execution of our code according to the specific structure of Intel CPUs and allow parallel 
                                                 
20 We discretize PEN into 5 points, whereas POP, INC, market fixed effects into 9 points each. The 
maximum number of branches in a market from large banks and small banks is 7 and 5, respectively.  
21 We use C++. Another option for scientific computation is Fortran. 
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computing as appropriate. With these techniques, we effectively reduce the computational time 
of 
1( )I F   to several minutes, compared to several hours with MATLAB on the same 
computer.  
Computation of the transition matrix is based on the discretized state space. The 
transition kernel for exogenous state variables are computed directly from data. For population 
and income, we assume that their logarithm transformed values follow AR(1) processes: 
 
, 1log( ) log( )
pop pop pop
mt m m t mtPOP POP u       (16) 
 
, 1log( ) log( )
inc inc inc
mt m m t mtINC INC u       (17) 
In Equation (16) and (17), we assume the autoregressive parameters 
pop  and inc  are 
homogenous but the mean values 
pop
m and 
inc
m may vary across markets. Because these AR(1) 
processes are highly persistent22, we use the method developed by Rouwenhorst (1995) to obtain 
the transition kernel of population and income. The transition kernel for penetration is computed 
directly from the observed data using a non-parametric frequency method. 
The transition of market structure variables are computed based on the estimated policy 
functions. Given that all players are making decisions simultaneously and independently, the 
expected number of active branches in the next period is distributed binomially according to the 
CCPs. For example, the probability that 
, 1
L
m tn   large bank branches will operate in the next period 
is given by: 
  
, 1
, 1 1 , 1 2
0
( | ) ( ; , ) ( ; , )
L
m tn
L L L L L
m t it mt m t mt mt
n
f n w B n n p B n n N n p

 

      (18) 
                                                 
22 
pop = 0.9996 and inc = 0.9656 from our estimation. 
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Here 1p  is the probability for a large incumbent to continue operating in the market, and 
2p  is the probability for a large potential entrant to enter the market. Both 1p  and 2p  can be 
calculated directly from the estimated policy functions. ( ; , ) (1 )
k n k
n
B k n p p p
k
   
 
 is the 
binomial probability density function and 
!
!( )!
n n
k k n k
 
 
 
. So 1( ; , )
L
mtB n n p is the probability 
that n out of Lmtn incumbent large bank branches continue operating in the next period, and 
, 1 2( ; , )
L L L
m t mt mtB n n N n p    is the probability that , 1( )
L
m tn n   out of ( )
L L
mt mtN n  potential entrants 
enter the market, where LmtN  is the total number of branches from large banks including 
incumbents and potential entrants.23 The probabilities for the number of small bank branches can 
be computed in a similar way. 
4.7 Results 
4.7.1 Deposit Demand Parameters 
Table 21 shows the results from the deposit demand regression. As one might expect, all 
the competition effects are negative. For example, when a market changes from a monopoly with 
one large bank branch to a duopoly with two large bank branches, the expected deposits at each 
branch decrease by (1 - exp( 4
L )) = 22.10%. Similarly, when a market changes from a monopoly 
with one large bank branch to a duopoly with one large and one small bank branch, the expected 
deposit for the large branch decreases by (1 - exp( 7
L )) = 19.29%. The coefficients of population 
                                                 
23 As mentioned previously, for empirical estimation we assume one potential entrant of each type. 
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for large and small banks are positive and comparable in magnitude. The coefficients of income 
are also positive as expected.  
More relevant and interesting results come from the coefficients of broadband 
penetration, which is positive and significant for large banks ( 3
L  = 0.1396, p = 0.04), but 
insignificant for small banks ( 3
S  = -0.0265, p = 0.67). Our result shows that a 10% increase in 
broadband penetration leads to a 1.41% increase in deposit for large banks, but has little impact 
on small banks. It may indicate that broadband consumers value the better online banking 
services from large banks and make more deposits in them. Our results are also consistent with a 
recent survey by ath Power Consulting, which shows that larger banks are improving their 
customer service at a faster rate than local community banks over the past few years because of 
their superior technology offerings.24 
Table 21. Estimates for deposit demand 
 Meaning Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Large Bank      
1
L
 Population (10,000) 1.0183 0.5394 1.89 0.06 
2
L
 Income ($10,000) 0.0284 0.0536 0.53 0.60 
3
L
 Penetration 0.1396 0.0678 2.06 0.04 
4
L
 First large competitor -0.2498 0.0526 -4.75 0.00 
5
L
 Second large Competitor -0.3391 0.0617 -5.50 0.00 
6
L
 Number of large competitors - 2  -0.1611 0.0569 -2.83 0.01 
7
L
 First small competitor -0.2143 0.0530 -4.05 0.00 
8
L
 Second small Competitor -0.3153 0.0505 -6.24 0.00 
9
L
 Number of small competitors - 2  -0.2803 0.0516 -5.44 0.00 
Small Bank      
1
S
 Population 0.8601 0.5410 1.59 0.11 
2
S
 Income 0.1015 0.0532 1.91 0.06 
                                                 
24 http://www.americanbanker.com/news/consumer-finance/big-banks-use-technology-to-boost-customer-
satisfaction-1073118-1.html 
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3
S
 Penetration -0.0265 0.0620 -0.43 0.67 
4
S
 First large competitor -0.2030 0.0541 -3.75 0.00 
5
S
 Second large Competitor -0.3009 0.0536 -5.62 0.00 
6
S
 Number of large competitors - 2  -0.1987 0.0493 -4.03 0.00 
7
S
 First small competitor -0.2182 0.0512 -4.26 0.00 
8
S
 Second small Competitor -0.1847 0.0513 -3.60 0.00 
9
S
 Number of small competitors - 2  -0.3763 0.0639 -5.89 0.00 
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4.7.2 Structural Parameters for Entry and Exit Decisions 
We have estimated four models with different configurations. In model M1, we omit state 
fixed effects for operating and entry costs, and set the revenue coefficients of deposits for both 
types of banks to be the same ( L S  ). In model M2, we include state fixed effects, but still 
keep the revenue coefficients to be the same. In model M3, we omit state fixed effects, but 
estimate different revenue coefficients for large and small banks. In model M4, we include state 
fixed effects and allow revenue coefficients to be different. For subsequent discussions we focus 
on the results from M4. Table 22 shows the results. 
Table 22. Estimates for structural parameters 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 
1
L  
Penetration on large bank operating 
costs 
-0.3326*** 
(0.1097) 
-0.3116*** 
(0.1192) 
-0.2969*** 
(0.1111) 
-0.2810** 
(0.1202) 
1
S  
Penetration on small bank 
operating costs 
-0.1086 
(0.1052) 
-0.0750 
(0.1149) 
-0.1509 
(0.1073) 
-0.1119 
(0.1166) 
1
L  
Penetration on large bank entry 
costs 
0.5789 
(0.3675) 
0.7285* 
(0.3859) 
0.6231* 
(0.3655) 
0.7806** 
(0.3847) 
1
S  
Penetration on small bank entry 
costs 
0.4448 
(0.4920) 
0.0125 
(0.5366) 
0.4025 
(0.4925) 
-0.0255 
(0.5369) 
L  Large bank deposit 
0.0011*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0029*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0026*** 
(0.0008) 
S  Small bank deposit 
0.0007* 
(0.0004) 
0.0007* 
(0.0004) 
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State fixed effects for operating costs N/A Included N/A Included 
State fixed effect for entry costs N/A Included N/A Included 
 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. 
 
Deposit. The coefficients are positive and significant ( L = 0.0026, p < 0.01; S =0.0007, 
p < 0.01). It is not surprising because one of the major functions for bank branches is to collect 
deposits from customers. With more deposits, banks earn more profits by making loans to firms 
or households, or investing in other financial products.  
Operating Costs. Our results show that the effects of broadband penetration on banks’ 
operating costs are asymmetric for large and small banks. While it can significantly reduce 
operating costs and increase profits for large banks, it has little impact on small banks. This is 
consistent with previous findings in the banking literature (Hunter & Timme, 1991; Maudos, 
Pastor, & Quesada, 1996; Mckillop, Glass, & Morikawa, 1996), and with Schumpeter’s 
theoretical conjecture that technology is generally a scale-increasing factor to market structure 
change (Schumpeter, 1942b). To quantify the effect of broadband penetration on operating costs, 
we divide 1
L  by L , which shows that for large banks a 1% increase in broadband penetration 
leads to a saving in operating costs equivalent to profits from $1 million deposits.  
Our results are consistent with the data from Reports of Condition and Income (Call 
Report), which is filed by all regulated financial institutions to FDIC on a quarterly basis and 
contains basic financial information such as balance sheet and income statement. The average 
noninterest expense per branch decreased by 13.55% for large banks, but only 2.69% for small 
banks from 2008 to 2013. In terms of labor costs, the average number of employees per branch 
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decreased by 40.04% for large banks, but only 8.01% for small banks in the same period.25 
Clearly the operational efficiency of large banks improved significantly in recent years. Our 
estimation results suggest that the technology change may be an important reason.  
Entry Cost. Our estimated coefficients for entry costs confirm the old adage that there 
isn’t such a thing as a free lunch. While large banks benefit from broadband penetration through 
the reduction in operating costs, they pay higher entry costs than smaller banks as broadband 
penetration increases. Our finding is consistent with the observation that IT related investment 
measured as the percentage of total assets for the 45 largest banks in the U.S. surpassed that of 
small banks (Cooke, 1997). Comparing the coefficients of penetration on operating costs ( 1
L ) 
and on entry costs ( 1
L ), large banks may recover the higher entry costs from broadband 
penetration in about 3 years. 
4.8 Counterfactual Simulations 
One important advantage of estimating a structural model is that it enables researchers to 
conduct policy experiments with the estimated primitives. Our primary interest in this research is 
to disentangle the effect of broadband penetration on deposit demand, branch operating costs and 
entry costs in an effort to understand how the U.S. banking industry evolves with IT technology 
advancement. To achieve this goal, we analyze how different factors contribute to the change of 
market structure from 2008 to 2013. In the following analysis, we set all effects of penetration on 
small banks to be zero ( 3 1 1 0
S S S     ) because their estimated results are not statistically 
significant. In effect we focus on the effects of broadband penetration on large banks only.  
                                                 
25 The total noninterest expense and number of employees come from RIAD4093 and RIAD4150 in Call 
Reports. 
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Specifically, we conduct five counterfactual experiments. In our first experiment (C1), 
we implement a counterfactual analysis with zero effect of broadband penetration on deposit 
demand, operating costs and entry costs ( 3 1 1 0
L L L     ). We will use the results of the first 
experiment as a benchmark to quantify the relative contribution of demand side and cost side 
factors. In the second experiment (C2), we use the estimated coefficient of broadband 
penetration on deposit demand while keeping other coefficients of penetration to zero, which 
enables us to quantify how the effect of penetration on deposit demand contributes to the 
entry/exit patterns. In the third experiment (C3), we use the estimated effect of broadband 
penetration on operating costs to show how the change in penetration affects market structure 
through changing operating cost. In the fourth experiment (C4), we consider a counterfactual 
analysis with estimated effect of penetration on entry costs only. Finally in (C5), we use all the 
estimated coefficients to simulate how the market structure evolves over time. In all simulations, 
we use the observed information at the beginning of 2008 as a starting point, and simulate the 
market evolution for 5 years. In each year, we compute the MPE of our model for all the 1,104 
local markets. 
We report the average results of 500 simulation runs in Table 23 and Table 24. Table 23 
shows the entry/exit probabilities, while Table 24 shows the average number of new entrants and 
exits. Because the patterns are similar in the two tables, we focus on the results in Table 23. The 
first half of Table 23 shows the average exit probabilities for incumbent branches and the 
average entry probabilities for potential entrants. The second half of the table shows percentage 
change of these probabilities relative to the base model (C1) where the effects of broadband 
penetration are fixed to be zero. 
Table 23. Counterfactual simulations for entry/exit probabilities 
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  C1 
(Base) 
C2 
(Demand) 
C 3 
(Operation) 
C 4 
(Entry) 
C 5 
(Aggregate) 
Probability       
 Exit – Large Bank 2.07% 1.97% 0.51% 1.92% 0.39% 
 Entry – Large Bank 1.73% 1.83% 6.59% 1.38% 6.20% 
 Exit – Small Bank 3.30% 3.31% 3.42% 3.30% 3.41% 
 Entry – Small Bank 1.04% 1.04% 1.01% 1.04% 1.01% 
Change from C1      
 Exit – Large Bank  -0.10% -1.56% -0.15% -1.68% 
 Entry – Large Bank  0.10% 4.87% -0.34% 4.47% 
 Exit – Small Bank  0.01% 0.12% 0.00% 0.11% 
 Entry – Small Bank  0.00% -0.03% 0.00% -0.03% 
 
 
Table 24. Counterfactual simulations for the number of branches 
 
  
C1 
(Base) 
C2 
(Demand) 
C 3 
(Operation) 
C 4 
(Entry) 
C 5 
(Aggregate) 
Probability       
 Exit – Large Bank 23.74 22.64 6.56 21.89 4.96 
 Entry – Large Bank 19.09 20.20 72.74 15.38 68.39 
 Exit – Small Bank 50.80 51.11 52.55 50.96 52.56 
 Entry – Small Bank 11.58 11.42 10.99 11.66 11.14 
Change from C1      
 Exit – Large Bank  -1.10 -17.18 -1.85 -18.78 
 Entry – Large Bank  1.11 53.65 -3.71 49.30 
 Exit – Small Bank  0.31 1.75 0.16 1.76 
 Entry – Small Bank  -0.16 -0.59 0.08 -0.44 
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Deposit demand. Because large banks may receive more consumer deposits with higher 
broadband penetration, the exit rate of large banks decreases by 0.10% from 2.07% in C1 to 
1.97% in C2. Meanwhile, the entry rate of large banks increases by 0.10% from 1.73% in C1 to 
1.83% in C2. Given that there are 1,159 large bank branches in 1,104 markets in 2008, this 
simulation results imply an increase of 23 large bank branches in the 5 years due to the effect of 
broadband penetration on deposit demand. On the small bank side, entry/exit probabilities 
change slightly due to competition effects from large banks. 
Operating Costs. Based on our simulation results, the effect of broadband penetration on 
operating costs turns out to be the most important factor driving the market structure change. A 
comparison of C3 to C1 shows that, with the increase in broadband penetration, the exit rate of 
large bank branches decreases by 1.56% from 2.07% to 0.51%, while the entry rate increases by 
4.87% from 1.73% to 6.59%. The reduction in operating costs from online banking leads to 72 
more branches for large banks. At the same time, this hurts small banks and results in a 0.12% 
higher exit rate and a 0.03% lower entry rate.  
Entry Costs. Higher entry costs for large banks have asymmetric effects on incumbent 
branches and potential entrants. As shown in C4, the exit rate of large incumbent branches 
decreases by 0.15%, and the entry rate of large potential entrants also decreases by 0.34%. The 
change in the entry rates can be explained by the increase in entry costs. The change in exit rate 
illustrates a nice feature of our dynamic model: because the incumbent branches expect less 
competition from fewer entrants and the increase in re-entry costs in the future once they exit, 
the incumbent branches will be more likely to stay in the market. Due to the small change in the 
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number of large bank branches, the impact on the entry/exit rate of small banks is minimal in our 
simulation. 
Aggregate Effect. As shown in C5, the aggregate effect of broadband penetration is 
consistent with the observed market structure change: an increase in large bank branches and a 
decrease in small bank branches. In summary, our simulation results show that the reduction in 
operating costs for large banks is the most important factor driving the recent market structure 
change in the U.S. banking industry.  
4.9 Conclusion 
In this research, we propose and estimate a dynamic discrete game framework to 
understand how technology advancement affects the evolution of market structure. A nice feature 
of this framework is that it can disentangle the contribution of demand, operating cost, and entry 
cost factors to the market structure change. When applying this framework to the U.S banking 
industry, we address the endogeneity of technology investment by collecting data on the 
exogenous technology penetration. 
Our estimation results show that broadband penetration has asymmetric effects on banks 
of different sizes. Specifically, large banks can take advantage of the increasingly higher 
residential broadband penetration in the U.S. by investing more on online banking services. As a 
result, they can improve efficiency and reduce costs in operating offline branches. Moreover, they 
can attract more customers and receive more deposits by offering better online banking services. 
Our counterfactual analysis shows that the reduction in operating costs in the most significant 
factor driving the recent change in the U.S. banking industry, followed by higher entry costs and 
deposit demand for large banks. 
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Our research has important implications for bank managers and policy makers. On the one 
hand, it may be appropriate to revisit the Riegle-Neal Act which requires that no bank holding 
company can control more than 10 percent of the nation's total deposits. To the extent that the 
increased concentration is a natural result of technology change, the strict limit on the deposit share 
of large banks might negatively affect social welfare. On the other hand, small banks may need a 
better strategy to benefit from the increasing Internet penetration. Given that the long term return 
from the improved efficiency in large banks can easily justify the increased entry costs, smaller 
banks can learn from the successful practice of large banks. 
Several limitations of this study may warrant future research. First, we use a reduced form 
approach to model the deposit demand because we do not observe branch-level interest rates and 
loans. Given adequate data one might develop a more accurate model of local competition on 
banking services. Second, we abstract from any network effects that may be related to the 
entry/exit decision of a bank in a specific market (Bresnahan & Reiss, 1991; Mazzeo, 2002). A 
model with global players competing in local markets is beyond the scope of this research. Third, 
we do not explicitly model mergers and acquisitions in this framework. Future research may 
incorporate mergers and acquisitions and see how technology advancement affects merger 
decisions in the U.S. banking industry. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusions and Future Research 
This dissertation provides a comprehensive investigation on both consumer and firm 
behaviors in the multi-channel environment. Our results highlight the importance of considering 
consumers’ cross channel behaviors in designing firm strategies. 
Although we have rich findings in the three essays, there are some important limitations 
in this dissertation that deserve future research. For example, my dissertation focuses on online 
and offline channel only because of data limitations. However, more and more consumers do not 
discriminate between the tradition online and the new mobile channels in information search and 
marking purchases. With uninterrupted access to consumers, the mobile channel offers an 
exciting opportunity for marketers to build valuable relationships with consumers by identifying 
their personal identities, geographic locations, and social communication patterns. Unfortunately, 
Future research can extend our ideas to evaluate how consumers and firms interact in the online, 
offline and mobile channels. We believe our basic frameworks, such as the nested logit structure 
in the first essay and the entry/exit model, still hold after including the mobile channel. Other 
interesting future research may include: to investigate how the offline store entry affects 
consumers’ purchase decisions as well as information search; to formally model the merge and 
acquisition in the banking industry after the introduction of online banking.  
In summary, we hope this dissertation will inspire more studies on consumer and firm 
behaviors in the multi-channel environment, contribute to the Marketing literature and provide 
managerial implications for firms when introducing more channels. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A.    Selection of Nest Structure (Chapter Three) 
Our nest structure is chosen by comparing the model fit between alternative nest 
structures. By putting form factor, channel, and firm onto different levels, there could be six 
alternative two-level structures and another six alternative three-level structures. We estimate all 
the twelve specifications and select the one that provides the best fit to our data. It is worth 
noting that a nested logit model corresponds to certain correlation structure in the error term, 
rather than imposing a customer choice process. For example, Hensher et al. (2005) point out 
that “…the entire purpose in creating a nested form is to try and accommodate violation of 
IID/IIA. It has nothing to do with any behavioral belief in the way that alternatives are assessed 
in the process of making a choice. This distinction is very important because many analysts think 
that nested choice models are a way of defining the decision process that links behavioral 
choices.” Researchers have shown how a nested logit model can be developed from correlations 
in the variance components without any assumptions on the customer decision process (e.g. 
Berry 1994; Cardell 1997). We therefore follow Sriram et al. (2006) to use the sum of squared 
errors as the criterion for comparison. As reported in Table A.1, the nest structure depicted in 
Figure 1 gives the smallest sum of squared errors. We believe this specification captures 
reasonably well the correlations between sub-sets of alternative PC models, and also facilitates 
our study of intra-brand cannibalization within a firm and inter-brand competition between firms 
within a market. 
Table A.1: Model Fit Comparison 
First Level Second Level 
Third 
Level 
Sum of 
Squared Errors 
110 
 
110 
 
Form Factor + 
Channel 
Vendor  369.6405 
Form Factor Channel + Vendor  380.9223 
Form Factor Vendor Channel 401.6364 
Form Factor Channel Vendor 424.0485 
Channel 
Form Factor + 
vendor 
 641.0817 
Channel Form Factor Vendor 784.9967 
Vendor Form Factor Channel 2702.4180 
Vendor 
Form Factor + 
Channel 
 2744.0263 
Form Factor + 
Vendor 
Channel  3011.6502 
Channel Vendor 
Form 
Factor 
3934.1357 
Channel + Vendor Form Factor  6133.2251 
Vendor Channel 
Form 
Factor 
15673.0967 
 
Appendix B.    GMM Estimator (Chapter Three) 
GMM was developed by Hansen (1982), who proved the consistency and asymptotic 
normality of a GMM estimator under general conditions. Unlike a maximum likelihood 
estimator which requires complete knowledge of the data distribution, GMM only relies on a set 
of moment conditions E[g(x,θ)]=0 where x represents the data and θ represents the model 
parameters. In order to estimate θ, one can replace E[g(x,θ)] by its empirical analog 
?̂?(𝑥, 𝜃) =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑔(𝑥𝑖, 𝜃)
𝑛
𝑖=1   
and then minimize the objective function: 
𝜃GMM = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜃
{?̂?(𝑥, 𝜃)′?̂??̂?(𝑥, 𝜃)}. 
Here, W can be any positive-definite weighting matrix. With right choice of the 
weighting matrix a GMM estimator is asymptotically efficient. 
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For this paper, what is relevant to us is that GMM provides a useful tool to address the 
endogeneity in non-linear models using instruments. It becomes two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
when applied to linear models. Note that the identifying assumption of 2SLS is the orthogonality 
between the error term (ξ) and instruments (z). The same orthogonality condition becomes the 
moment condition in GMM for non-linear models, i.e., g(x,θ)=ξ(θ)∙z. By minimizing the GMM 
objective function, we can obtain the estimates for all model parameters, including ρlm and σjlm. 
Specifically, in our model, let ξ(θ) be the vector of all error terms (ξijlm) as a function of model 
parameters θ. Let Z be a matrix that contains all observations of the instrumental and exogenous 
variables. Our GMM estimator can be written as: 
𝜃GMM = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜃
{𝜉′(𝜃)𝑍?̂?𝑍′𝜉(𝜃)}. 
We obtain an optimal weighting matrix by following the two-step procedure proposed by 
Hayashi (2000). 
 
 
 
